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INTRODUCTION

The last several decades have witnessed a dramatic change
in how our society conceives of family, parenthood, pregnancy,
childbirth, and gender roles. One issue at the heart of this
change was the successful uncoupling of intercourse from
reproduction via assisted reproductive technology (ART). 1 ART
has made it possible for a wealth of individuals, who would
otherwise be unable, to create families and become parents. 2
Traditionally, most people think of infertile couples as the
beneficiaries of such technology, but ART has special and
important implications for gay and/or unmarried persons as
well. 3 Dubbed the “structurally infertile,” this latter group, if
desirous of reproducing, “must do so through means other than
sexual intercourse because of the social structure in which they
self-identify.” 4
Despite the growth in popularity of ART for both the
medically and structurally infertile, ART continues to be a
mainly private-payer enterprise, reserved for those individuals
who have the expendable income to pay for these expensive
technologies. 5 Given both the high demand for ART as well as
the astronomically high cost for some ART procedures, some
states have begun mandating insurance coverage as a means of
ensuring that a wider range of people are able to access
reproductive technologies. 6 While much focus has been on
whether insurance should be mandated for such procedures,
little attention has been paid to the unusual consequences of
mandated insurance for consumers of ART, particularly gay
and unmarried persons. Of the fourteen states with some form
of insurance mandate, none explicitly excludes gay or

1. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based
Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297,
333.
2. Id. at 311–12.
3. Id. at 314–15.
4. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible
Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 24 (2008).
5. Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business,
10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 49–50 (2009).
6. Note, In Vitro Fertilization: Insurance and Consumer Protection, 109
HARV. L. REV. 2092, 2095–96 (1996) [hereinafter In Vitro Fertilization].
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unmarried persons from coverage, but many serve to indirectly
exclude these groups, raising distinct ethical and legal issues
around what a state owes its citizens with respect to insurance
coverage of ART. 7 Even more legally problematic is the implicit
exclusion of persons who are not only structurally infertile, but
also have a medical cause for their infertility. For purposes of
this Article, I will call this group the “medico-structurally
infertile.” Taken both individually and as a whole, these
regulations raise significant questions as to the purpose of state
mandates for ART. Further questions relate to the intentions of
such laws with respect to unmarried and gay persons and the
political, religious, and health justice issues related to marital
status, reproduction, sexual orientation, resource allocation,
and health.
This Article explores the legal and ethical tensions between
the purpose of health insurance, the desire to improve access to
ART for everyone, and the unique legal and ethical implications
of state-mandated insurance for structurally infertile and
medico-structurally infertile persons. Part II provides an
overview of the types of technologies that qualify as ART, as
well as statistics on the types of groups accessing or interested
in accessing ART. In this section, the high cost of ART, methods
of payment, and the role of cost as a barrier to access are also
explored. State mandates for insurance coverage are set forth
in Part III, and statutory language of individual mandates is
used to demonstrate two types of limits on state mandates:
external limits, such as limits on dollar amounts or numbers of
procedures, and internal limits, which limit treatments based
on the social status of the individual. The various implicit
exclusions of gay and unmarried persons are also explored.
Part IV sets forth some of the legal challenges raised by
implicit exclusion of insurance coverage for these groups. Due
Process, Equal Protection, and Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) challenges are each discussed. In Part V, the context of
state-mandated insurance coverage for ART is explored in the
broader framework of health justice, resource allocation,
religious and political considerations with respect to sexual
orientation, marital status, and the purposes of health

7. Nicole Rank, Comment, Barriers for Access to Assisted Reproductive
Technologies by Lesbian Women: The Search for Parity Within the Healthcare
System, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 115, 136–41 (2009).
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insurance. Health justice is used as the main rationale for
arguing that gay and unmarried persons should be granted
insurance coverage for ART under state mandates. Lastly, in
Part VI, the advantages and disadvantages of state-mandated
insurance versus an alternative mechanism of tax deductions
are explored with particular attention paid to the implications
of these mechanisms for gay and unmarried persons.
Concluding that state mandates are currently the best solution
for ensuring wider access to ART for everyone, the Article
encourages legislatures to consider a number of important
ethical, legal, and social factors in drafting state mandates for
insurance coverage of ART and in ensuring fair access for gay
and unmarried persons.
II. BACKGROUND: USAGE, ACCESS, AND COST IN
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
A. DEFINITIONS AND TECHNOLOGY
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
defines ART, widely known as ART, as “all fertility treatments
in which both eggs and sperm are handled.” 8 In this way, ART
is “designed to enable conception . . . when coital reproduction
is either not possible or not desirable.” 9 ART encompasses a
number of specific techniques and procedures including:
gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), which is the placing of
eggs and sperm into the fallopian tubes; zygote intrafallopian
transfer (ZIFT), which is the placing of a zygote in the fallopian
tubes; and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), which is
“the direct insertion of an individual sperm into the ovum,” a
technique often used to remedy male-factor infertilities. 10 Invitro fertilization (IVF) is the most complex, invasive, and
expensive of all the ARTs. 11 IVF begins with hormone therapy
given to the woman to induce ovulation, followed by egg
8. Assisted Reproductive Technology, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/art (last updated Oct. 21, 2010).
9. Justyn Lezin, (Mis)conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally
Unmarried Women’s Access to Reproductive Technology and their Use of
Known Donors, 14 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 185, 190 (2003).
10. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 45–46.
11. See Daar, supra note 4, at 20 n.3 (describing the procedural steps
necessary for IVF); Elizabeth A. Pendo, The Politics of Infertility: Recognizing
Coverage Exclusions as Discrimination, 11 CONN. INS. L.J. 293, 300 (2005)
(suggesting that IVF is more complex than another form of artificial
insemination); Schultz, supra note 1, at 339 n.125.
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retrieval and fertilization of the eggs with semen, incubation of
the fertilized egg(s) in a laboratory dish for several days until
an embryo is formed, and, lastly, the transplant of the embryo
directly into the uterus. 12 All of the above technologies may or
may not involve the use of gamete donors (third parties that
donate eggs and sperm), 13 cryopreservation and storage of
gametes, 14 and/or gestational surrogates (third parties that
gestate and birth the fetus), all of which are factors particularly
relevant for gay and unmarried persons considering ART. 15
Though not considered an ART, artificial insemination, where
sperm is transferred into a female’s reproductive tract to
produce pregnancy, 16 implicates ethical and legal challenges
similar to that of ART, 17 and is also a popular method of
pregnancy for lesbians and single women because it enables
pregnancy without sexual intercourse with a male. 18
Different medical and structural needs, as well as gender
issues, determine the type of ART one uses to become pregnant.
Lesbian couples and single women may often achieve
pregnancy through the simpler method of artificial
insemination, if there are no medically-related problems. 19
Using a known or anonymous sperm donor, the single woman
or lesbian woman can become pregnant with the use of her own
eggs and can gestate the pregnancy, barring any medical
barriers. 20 Gay or single men who wish to reproduce require
the use of a gestational surrogate, who is impregnated by any
of the techniques above using the sperm of the single man, one
of the couple members, or a donor. 21 For structurally infertile
12. Pendo, supra note 11, at 300.
13. Shultz, supra note 1, at 312.
14. Daar, supra note 4, at 20 n.4.
15. Id. at 33.
16. James Ringo ed., Tenth Annual Review of Gender and Sexuality Law:
Health Care Law Chapter: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, 10 GEO. J.
GENDER & L. 859, 860–61 (2009).
17. Rank, supra note 7, at 127.
18. See id. at 130 (suggesting that many women find greater success with
physician-assisted insemination than with self-insemination).
19. See Bebe J. Anderson, Lesbians, Gays, and People Living with HIV:
Facing and Fighting Barriers to Assisted Reproduction, 15 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 451, 453–454 (2009) (suggesting that artificial insemination is
particularly relevant to lesbians, and that it can be ceased if the donor is found
to be HIV positive).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 453.
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individuals or couples who also have medical infertility, the
type of ART used depends on both the structural infertility as
well as the type of medical infertility. 22 In these instances, the
more expensive IVF and gestational surrogacy may be
necessary. For example, a single woman with blocked fallopian
tubes would require sperm donation because of her structural
infertility, but would also require in-vitro fertilization because
of her medical infertility. 23
B. POPULARITY OF ART
The business of treating infertility is booming, with more
than one million individuals seeking infertility treatment on an
annual basis. 24 ART usage has rapidly increased over the last
decade, with the number of ART cycles and babies born from
ART doubling between 1996 and 2005. 25 More than 54,000
babies were born in the United States with the help of assisted
reproduction in 2006 alone, which accounts for more than one
percent of U.S. births that year. 26 Scholars estimate that the
business of assisted reproduction in the United States is “at
least a $1.7 billion market before even considering sperm sales,
high-end eggs, legal fees, surrogacy, or adoption.” 27
The ten percent of the population that suffers from
medically-related infertility accounts for a significant portion of
ART use. 28 Medical infertility affects both genders and occurs
across all races, ethnic backgrounds, and socioeconomic
levels. 29 “The incidence of structural infertility. . . [however] is
largely unknown, as no government surveys report such
figures.” 30 Data suggests, however, that structurally infertile
persons are also finding ways, whether by ART or otherwise, to

22. Id. at 454–55 (explaining differences in ART methods when a donor or
surrogate is infected with HIV).
23. Rank, supra note 7, at 119.
24. Pendo, supra note 11, at 298.
25. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 46.
26. Assisted Reproductive Technology Surveillance System, CTRS. FOR
DISEASE
CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://cdc.gov/Reproductivehealth/DRH/activities/ART.htm (last updated July
31, 2009).
27. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5 at 47.
28. See Daar, supra note 4, at 24, 34 (stating that 1.2 million medically
infertile women sought ART in 2005, and that the majority of ART patients
are heterosexual, married women).
29. Pendo, supra note 11, at 298.
30. Daar, supra note 4, at 25.
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have families. 31
The rates of reproduction outside of heterosexual married
relationships have been increasing in recent years.
Approximately forty percent of births in the Unites States are
now to single, unmarried women. 32 Additionally, the 1980s saw
an increase in children born to lesbian women. The same
increase occurred with gay men in the 1990s, causing the
media to coin the term the “gay baby boom.” 33 “Currently in the
United States, there are an estimated six to fourteen million
children being raised by at least one gay or lesbian parent,
usually as a result of a heterosexual relationship.” 34 “[T]he
2000 Census Report documented a total of 594,000 households
headed by same-sex couples; thirty-three percent of female
same-sex households and twenty-two percent of male couples
had children.” 35 However, it is difficult to estimate the extent
to which this trend in families raised by single or gay persons is
due to ART versus other factors. 36 Newspaper accounts
“suggest that one-third of all [artificial insemination]
consumers in the U.S. are unmarried women,” indicating that
there is a strong current of structurally infertile groups making
use of ART. 37
The burgeoning market of ART is appealing to both
medically infertile and structurally infertile groups as a means
of creating genetic offspring. The next section will discuss some
of the financial and access issues raised by ART for these
groups.

31. Id. at 28.
32. The Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Access to
Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons, 92 FERTILITY
& STERILITY 1190, 1190 (2009) [hereinafter ASRM].
33. Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian
Women, 4 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 147, 147–48 (2000).
34. ASRM, supra note 32, at 1191.
35. Daar, supra note 4, at 32–33.
36. See DeLair, supra note 33, at 147 (suggesting that most children being
raised by gay men and lesbian women result from previously heterosexual
relationships, but that the number of children born to gay and lesbian couples
utilizing ART is rising).
37. Daar, supra note 4, at 25.
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C. PURSE STRINGS AND PARENTHOOD: COST AS A BARRIER TO
ART
ART is a costly endeavor in the United States. Staniec and
Webb aptly describe the situation when they say that, for many
infertile couples, the question is not whether or not to have
children, but rather “[h]ow will we get pregnant?” followed
closely by “[h]ow will we afford it?” 38 The average cost of one
cycle of IVF is “more than $10,000 and it frequently takes
multiple cycles to achieve pregnancy, with success rates
decreasing with each try.” 39 Cost for a successful delivery as a
result of IVF is estimated at $66,667 if successful by the first
cycle and as high as $114,286 if it takes six cycles. 40 These
costs vary by a number of patient factors, but can be even
higher when egg donation or gestational surrogacy is
involved. 41 Other forms of ART, such as artificial insemination,
are more affordable but still cost over $1,000 and do not work
for everyone. 42
It is important to reiterate that, in the context of structural
infertility, high-tech and expensive interventions may not
always be necessary, but sometimes are. Single women and
lesbians without medical infertility may become successfully
pregnant with sperm donation, which is fairly inexpensive or
may even be gifted. 43 Artificial insemination can be done at
home at no cost or at a physician’s office. 44 Multiple attempts

38. See J. Farley Ordovensky Staniec & Natalie J. Webb, Utilization of
Infertility Services: How Much Does Money Matter, 42 HEALTH SERV. RES. 971,
971–72 (2007).
39. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 49.
40. See id.
41. Donor eggs typically cost between $3,000 and $5,000 with an average
IVF cycle then costing between $15,000 and $25,000. “Some small portion of
these eggs—known colloquially as ‘Ivy League’ or ‘designer’ eggs—fetched in
the range of $25,000 to $ 50,000.” Id. at 47. Gestational surrogacy is also an
expensive endeavor. “Currently, the typical fee for a first time surrogate
mother ranges from $14,000 to $18,000, with an average of $15,000.” Jennifer
Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should
Surrogate Mothers be Compensated for their Services?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD &
FAM. ADVOC. 529, 531 (2007). This payment may be significantly higher where
the surrogate agrees to additional medical tests or to carry or implant multiple
fetuses. See id. at 531–32.
42. See Melissa B. Jacoby, Show Me the Money: Making Markets in
Forbidden Exchange: The Debt Financing of Parenthood, 72 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 147, 149 (2009).
43. See DeLair, supra note 33, at 160.
44. See id.
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however, may cost thousands of dollars. 45 Furthermore, gay or
single men must rely on gestational surrogacy and may require
egg donation, both of which are very expensive practices. 46
Certainly, too, any such individuals who experience some
medical infertility may also require IVF or other more invasive
and costly forms of ART.
In addition, while some people advocate adoption as an
alternative to ART for the medically and/or structurally
infertile, adoption can also be an expensive endeavor and does
not satisfy the goals of creating a genetically-related child,
which is important to some individuals or couples. 47
Furthermore, some laws prohibit certain structurally infertile
persons, including gay and unmarried persons, from adopting
children. 48
Not surprisingly, researchers have found that “financial
access . . . [has] significant effects on the probability of seeking
infertility treatments.” 49 Income and insurance coverage of
infertility services are two of the major predictors for seeking
infertility treatment, and few individuals have fertility
treatments like ART covered under their healthcare plans. 50
International surveys of foreign countries also indicate that
cost plays a large role in access to ART. “Nations with national
health care systems report higher rates of infertility helpseeking.” 51 In the United States, where the cost of treatment is
45. Id.
46. “After medical and legal bills are calculated, the entire final cost of a
surrogacy arrangement may be $20,000–$30,000 or more.” Id. at 161.
47. “Adoption costs vary greatly depending on the type of adoption and
the characteristics of the child.” While foster-care adoptions can be relatively
inexpensive, some adoptions can cost as much as $30,000 or more.
Additionally, foreign adoptions can also be time-consuming and expensive. See
Jacoby, supra note 42, at 150.
48. For example, in Utah, “[i]n order to adopt, you must be an adult who
is either married (and has permission from your spouse) or single (and not
cohabiting with another person).” This requirement rules out individuals who
are gay and individuals who are unmarried but cohabitating with a partner.
LEGAL
SERVS.,
Domestic
Law
Handbook,
UTAH
http://www.utahlegalservices.org/public/self-help-webpages/domestic-lawhandbook#Adoption (last modified Aug. 10, 2009).
49. Staniec & Webb, supra note 38, at 985.
50. Lynn K. White et al., Explaining Disparities in Treatment Seeking:
The Case of Infertility, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 853, 855 (2006). The role
that insurance coverage plays in increasing access to ART will be discussed in
more depth later in this paper.
51. Id.
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paid out-of-pocket, only one-half of all infertile women seek
treatment. 52 In contrast, other developed nations which cover
infertility treatment have much higher rates of access. 53
The high cost of ART and its impact on access have led
many to challenge the system as “inherently inequit[able].” 54
One scholar claims that “only a fortunate few can afford to
spend $50,000, much less $100,000, in order to have a chance
at a baby . . . [m]any couples are forced out of the baby business
from the outset.” 55 Another critiques the field of assisted
reproduction as “relying on the emotional desperation of
childless couples to inflate the asking price” and argues that
ART “provide[s] choice for affluent middle-class couples . . .
however, the same privilege is denied to the less affluent.” 56
Furthermore, worrisome practices exist among the eightyfive percent of infertile individuals who do choose to pay for
these technologies out-of-pocket. “They will mortgage their
houses, sell their cars, deplete the family savings” or sign up
“for a host of credit cards and charg[e] up to their credit
limit.” 57 Banks are now even offering fertility market loans to
eligible consumers. 58
D. PROPOSED ECONOMIC SOLUTIONS TO ACCESS ISSUES IN ART
Mandated insurance coverage has been proposed as a
means of reducing inequity in assisted reproduction and
equalizing access across socioeconomic groups. The high
demand for and costs of ART and the frequent need for
multiple interventions all serve as disincentives for insurers to
cover such procedures under health plans. “Only one in four
employers cover some form of fertility services, and ARTs, the
most expensive fertility treatments, are unlikely to be
52. A. L. Greil & J. McQuillan, Help-Seeking Patterns among Subfecund
Women, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 305, 312 tbl.2 (2004).
53. See Daar, supra note 4, at 37 (noting that infertile women seek
treatment 67% of the time in Finland, 86% of the time in the Netherlands, and
72–95% of the time in the United Kingdom.).
54. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 50.
55. Id.
56. Meena Lal, The Role of the Federal Government in Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 13 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J.
517, 530–31 (1997).
57. Jacoby, supra note 42, at 150; see also Anna L. Benjamin, The
Implications of Using the Medical Expense Deduction of I.R.C. 213 to Subsidize
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 NOTRE DAME. L. REV. 1117, 1129 (2004).
58. See Jacoby, supra note 42, at 161.
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included.” 59 Lobbyists in favor of mandated insurance have
encouraged reform at both the state and federal level. While
federal reform has not yet been successful, efforts in the House
of Representatives to mandate coverage for infertility still
persist with the Family Building Act of 2009. The Act, which
was introduced by Representative Anthony Weiner (D-NY), has
been referred to the House Oversight and Government Reform
Committee. 60 Additionally, since the 1980s, fourteen states
have successfully mandated some type of insurance coverage
for fertility treatment. 61
Among these fourteen states, most do not require broad
insurance coverage of ART. Many exclude certain types of
infertility or certain treatments (especially IVF, the most
expensive treatment). 62 Additionally, many of these state
mandates do not encompass employer-funded health benefit
plans because of the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act. 63 In states that mandate some form of coverage, “rates of
access to assisted reproduction have been significantly
higher.” 64 However, many people in these states are still left
without coverage because they either do not have insurance or
are covered by self-insured employers that fall outside of these
mandates. 65 Additionally, many of these statutes implicitly bar
unmarried or same sex couples from coverage, regardless of
whether they have a medical infertility that might otherwise
qualify under the statute. Lastly, because persons in same sex
relationships are unable to legally marry in most states, they
often cannot be covered under their partners’ insurance. 66
59. Benjamin, supra note 57, at 1121.
60. Family Building Act of 2009, H.R. 697, 111th Cong. (2009), available
at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-697. The act would
have required any insurer covering impotence to also cover fertility treatment,
but it failed to survive House subcommittees on health and labor-management
relations and was stalled a month after it had been introduced in Congress.
61. Benjamin, supra note 57 at 1121–22; Aaron C. McKee, The American
Dream - 2.5 Kids and a White Picket Fence: The Need for Federal Legislation to
Protect the Insurance Rights of Infertile Couples, 41 WASHBURN L.J. 191, 205
(2001).
62. See Maren Minnaert & Melissa Tai, Fourth Annual Review of Gender
and Sexuality Law: Family Law Chapter: Assisted Reproductive Technology, 4
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 299, 323–24 (2002).
63. Benjamin, supra note 57, at 1121–22.
64. Jacoby, supra note 42, at 152.
65. Id.
66. Rank, supra note 7, at 130.
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III. REGULATION OF ART AND MANDATED INSURANCE
COVERAGE
To understand how medical and structural fertility are
treated under the regulatory framework of ART, one must first
understand the status of ART regulation more generally.
Currently, federal laws provide little guidance on the practice
or provision of ART to the public, including whether or not
insurance providers are required to cover ART. The duty of
regulating who can access ART and whether it should be paid
for by insurance companies has mainly fallen to the individual
states and, in some instances, the infertility treatment centers
and providers.
In the fourteen states that have enacted laws requiring
insurers to cover diagnosis and/or treatment of infertility, there
are varying levels of coverage depending on a number of
factors. Factors such as the types of treatments covered by a
mandate and how much of the treatment must be covered are,
for our purposes, referred to as “external factors.” These
external factors place limits on access to ART, regardless of
who is seeking treatment. Factors determining who is
permitted to seek treatment under a given mandate are referred
to as “internal factors” because they base coverage decisions on
the individual’s personal characteristics, such as marriage
status, sexual orientation, or medical disability.
External factors include a number of limits on the scope of
coverage provided under the mandates. For example, some
mandates require that coverage be provided for fertility
treatments, as seen in Arkansas, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York,
Ohio, Rhode Island, and West Virginia. 67 Other states, such as

67. Arkansas’ statute provides coverage only for IVF and does not
mention other fertility treatments. ARK. CODE ANN. §23-86-118 (2004)
(stating all health insurance companies “shall include, as a covered expense,
in vitro fertilization”). Connecticut’s statute requires that health insurance
policy “shall provide coverage for the medically necessary expenses of . . .
infertility.” CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007). Hawaii mandates
pregnancy-related benefits “shall include in addition to any other benefits for
treating infertility, a one-time only benefit for all outpatient expenses arising
from in vitro fertilization.” HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005). Illinois’
statute mandates that “[n]o group policy. . . may be issued . . . unless the
policy contains coverage for the diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m (West 2008). Maryland’s statute mandates
that “[a]n entity . . . that provides pregnancy-related benefits may not exclude
benefits for all outpatient expenses arising from in-vitro fertilization.” MD.
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California and Texas, only require that infertility treatment be
offered. 68 Some states place limits that depend on the specific
treatment in question. For instance, California and New York
have expressly excluded IVF from the fertility treatments
covered, 69 while Arkansas specifically includes IVF but does
not identify other fertility treatments. 70 A number of the states
limit coverage by placing a maximum dollar amount or by
limiting the number of procedures that are covered. 71

CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). Massachusetts requires any
blanket or general policy of insurance “shall provide, to the same extent that
benefits are provided for other pregnancy-related procedures, coverage for
medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 175, § 47H (LexisNexis 2008). Montana requires health
maintenance organizations to cover “basic health services” which are defined
to include “infertility services.” MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-31-102 (2009). New
Jersey mandates that group health insurance policy “shall provide coverage
which includes, but is not limited to, the following services related to
infertility.” N.J. STAT. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). New York’s statute states that”
[e]very policy which provides coverage for hospital care shall not exclude
coverage . . . solely because the medical condition results in infertility.” N.Y.
INSURANCE LAW § 3216 (2010). Ohio requires health maintenance
organizations to cover “basic health services,” which include “infertility
services.” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2009). Rhode
Island requires any health insurance contract “shall provide coverage for
medically necessary expenses of diagnosis and treatment of infertility.” R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008). West Virginia requires health maintenance
organizations to cover “basic health care services,” which includes “infertility
services.” W. VA. CODE § 33-25A-2(1) (LexisNexis 2006). See generally State
Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, NAT’L CONF. OF
LEGISLATURES,
STATE
http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/Health/InsuranceCoverageforInfertility
Laws/tabid/14391/Default.aspx (last updated September 2010) [hereinafter
NCSL].
68. See CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008) (requiring that
“every health care service plan . . . shall offer coverage for the treatment of
infertility, except in vitro fertilization”); TEX. INS. CODE 1366.003 (West 2009)
(stating that “an issuer of a group health benefit plan that provides
pregnancy-related benefits . . . shall offer and make available . . . coverage for .
. . expenses incurred . . . from in vitro fertilization procedures.”); see generally
NCSL, supra note 67.
69. See CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008) (“[e]very health
care service plan . . . shall offer coverage for the treatment of infertility, except
in vitro fertilization.”); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216 (3)(E)(i) (2010) (stating that
“[c]overage shall not be required to include . . . in vitro fertilization”).
70. The Arkansas statute provides that health plans “shall include, as a
covered expense, in vitro fertilization.” ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-86-118 (2004).
71. For example, Hawaii provides only a “one-time benefit for all
outpatient expenses arising from in vitro fertilization.” HAW. REV. STAT. §
431:10A-116.5 (2005). Maryland places a limit at “three in vitro fertilization
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Additionally, some states only offer more expensive procedures
such as IVF as a last resort and require that the patient
undergo less expensive procedures first. 72 Some statutes also
place limits on the types of plans that must cover certain
infertility treatments. For example, Ohio’s mandate only
applies to health maintenance organizations (HMOs), 73 and
other states allow religious institutions to opt out of coverage
that is “inconsistent with the religious organization’s religious
and ethical principles.” 74
For the most part, state insurance mandates based on
external factors apply equally to all individuals. While such
external factors are important with respect to individuals’
access to ART, it is those laws that use internal factors to
determine insurance coverage that are most significant with
respect to the rights of gay and/or unmarried persons. These
states’ insurance mandates contain one or more of the following
preconditions: (1) requirements that a person engage in
unprotected sexual intercourse for a particular number of years
without pregnancy, (2) requirements that the experience of
infertility last a particular number of years, (3) use of spousal
language, (4) requirements that the cause of infertility be
either medically caused or unexplained, and (5) requirements
that the infertility treatment be medically necessary. Tables 1a
and 1b describe which states require which preconditions.
These preconditions often translate into unequal access to
mandated insurance coverage on the basis of marriage status,
sexual orientation, and/or medical disability. Resulting legal
attempts per live birth, not to exceed a maximum lifetime benefit of $100,000.”
MD. CODE ANN., INS § 15-810(5)(d) (LexisNexis 2006). Illinois limits oocyte
retrieval to four, or two extra if a live birth follows oocyte retrieval. 215 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m (West 2008) New Jersey limits to four oocyte
retrievals in a lifetime. N.J. STAT. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). Connecticut makes
separate lifetime limits on cycles for each type of fertility treatment covered.
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007).
72. New Jersey limits availability to those who have “used all reasonable,
less expensive, and medically appropriate treatments.” N.J. Stat. § 17:48-6x
(West 2008). Illinois statute states that coverage for IVF, GIFT and ZIFT is
only available where “the covered individual has been unable to attain or
sustain a successful pregnancy though reasonable, less costly . . . treatments.”
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m (West 2008).
73. Ohio law requires health maintenance organizations to cover “basic
health services” which include “infertility services.,” OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
1751.01 (A)(1)(h) (LexisNexis 2009).
74. See e.g. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007). Among states
providing religious exemption are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland,
New Jersey, and Texas.
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challenges will be discussed in turn.
Table 1a: Summary of State’s Statutory Language in
Mandates for Insurance Coverage of ART
(X) number of years of
sexual relations without
contraception
Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Hawaii
Illinois
Maryland
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Rhode Island
Texas
West Virginia

(X) number of years of
infertility

X
X
X
X
X

X

Table 1b: Summary of State’s Statutory Language in
Mandates for Insurance Coverage of ART

Arkansas
California
Connecticut
Hawaii
Illinois
Maryland
Massachusetts
New Jersey
New York
Ohio
Rhode Island
Texas
West Virginia

Spouse
language

Medical
or
unexplained
cause
of
infertility

X

X

X

X

Medical
necessity

X

X

X
X

X
X
X
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A. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF STATE MANDATES
1. Statutes That Require Sexual Relations Without
Contraception
Three states, California, 75 Illinois, 76 and New Jersey, 77
have statutory language requiring that individuals engage in a
certain period of unprotected sex without successful pregnancy
in order to qualify for mandated insurance coverage. The
implications of this requirement are unclear for both
structurally and medico-structurally infertile persons. “While
the drafters of the legislation may not have intended to extend
coverage to [gay persons,] . . . it is conceivable that the
language and definition may be construed to include such
couples . . . through the acknowledgment that ‘regular sexual
relations’ could include sexual interactions between two people
of the same sex.” 78 However, the issue of what types of
intercourse would be included is a matter for the legislature
and the courts.
Among these three states, New Jersey’s language is the
most exclusionary. The statute requires that the inability to
conceive after the period of unprotected intercourse be caused
by a “disease or condition that results in the abnormal function
of the reproductive system.” 79 Gays, lesbians, and unmarried
persons with structural infertility are not likely to be viewed as
having abnormal functioning of their reproductive systems
given the very definition of structural infertility. Medicostructurally infertile persons, however, would fall under this
definition if they have proof of their medical condition.
In contrast, California’s statutory language does not
75. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b) (West 2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’
means either (1) the presence of a demonstrated condition recognized by a
licensed physician . . . as a cause of infertility, or (2) the inability to conceive a
pregnancy or to carry a pregnancy to a live birth after a year or more of
regular sexual relations without contraception.” (emphasis added)).
76. 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/356m(2)(c) (West 2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’
means the inability to conceive after one year of unprotected sexual
intercourse or the inability to sustain a successful pregnancy.”).
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’ means the
disease or condition that results in the abnormal function of the reproductive
system such that a person is not able to: impregnate another person; conceive
after two years of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is under 35
years of age, or one year of unprotected intercourse if the female partner is 35
years of age or older.”).
78. Rank, supra note 7, at 139.
79. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008).
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require disease and only requires a period of unprotected
intercourse. 80 Consequently, California’s statute does not
necessarily eliminate gay or unmarried persons. On the
contrary, this requirement could exclude persons who are
heterosexual and married if they failed to engage in
unprotected sex. However, the applicability of the statute to
gay and unmarried persons may differ from its applicability to
heterosexual married for a number of reasons. First, same sex
couples may not attempt unprotected sex because their
intercourse is not intended for procreative purposes, and
unmarried persons may not engage in sexual intercourse,
protected or unprotected, because they do not have a partner
with whom they wish to procreate. Thus, while either a same
sex couple or unmarried person may wish to reproduce,
unprotected intercourse may not be an avenue that is possible
or desirable. 81 Second, it is unclear the extent to which the
statute requires monogamous sexual intercourse. As an
example, a single person could engage in heterosexual
unprotected sexual activity with a variety of partners over a
period of years without becoming pregnant, but this could be
due to infertility of the partners or infrequency of intercourse,
as opposed to the infertility of the individual. Furthermore, the
same requirements apply to medico-structurally infertile
persons. Regardless of whether they are gay or unmarried,
medico-structurally infertile individuals only qualify for
mandated insurance coverage if they engage in intercourse and
the intercourse is unprotected. 82 This requirement has
interesting implications for both structurally and medicostructurally infertile persons, given that protection may be
used during sex for both pregnancy prevention and prevention
of sexually transmitted infections (STIs)—an issue which will
be discussed in greater detail later in this paper.

80. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1374.55(b) (West 2008).
81. Importantly, a requirement that a couple engage in unprotected sex is
also unusual in circumstances where individuals have known infertility, such
as an instance where a woman has a cancer-related hysterectomy. While the
unprotected sex requirement is likely in place to ensure that individuals who
can achieve natural pregnancy do so, it serves as a unique burden for those
who already know that intercourse will not achieve their reproductive goals.
82. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008).
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2. Statutes That Require Number Of Years Of Infertility
Perhaps the most inclusive statutory language defines
infertility as the “condition of a presumably healthy individual
who is unable to conceive or produce conception or sustain a
successful
pregnancy
during
a
one-year
period.” 83
84
85
86
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island all use this
language in their statutes, and New Jersey, while also
requiring unprotected intercourse, also uses the “condition”
language. 87 While Rhode Island’s language also requires that
the presumably healthy individual be married, 88 thus
eliminating all forms of structurally infertile persons, the
statutes of Connecticut and Massachusetts offer the broadest
language and greatest chance for inclusion of structurally
infertile persons. In these two states, the statutory language
does not require any type of medical cause for the infertility,
nor does it require that there be unprotected intercourse or an
abnormal functioning of the reproductive system. Given the
breadth of these statutes, structurally infertile persons and
medico-structurally infertile persons who have not reproduced
in a certain period of time may qualify in the same manner as
heterosexual individuals, depending on the interpretation of
the term “condition.” If, as one scholar argues, homosexuality
could easily be included as a condition that would prevent a
healthy individual from reproducing, 89 then structurally
infertile persons would be covered under these types of
mandates. However, a court could interpret the term
“condition” as meaning a medical condition that prevented
pregnancy. Furthermore, it is unclear what the statues mean
by the term “condition” and whether there are certain efforts
which must be made during that year period to prove
infertility, or, alternatively, whether one must simply live for a
year without producing pregnancy. This language is, however,

83. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN § 38a-536 (West 2007).
84. Id.
85. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (LexisNexis 2008)
(“‘[I]nfertility’ shall mean the condition of a presumably healthy individual
who is unable to conceive or produce conception during a period of one year.”).
86. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008) (“‘[I]nfertility’ means the condition of
an otherwise presumably healthy married individual who is unable to conceive
or sustain a pregnancy during a period of one year.”).
87. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008).
88. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008).
89. Rank, supra note 7, at 139–40.
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the broadest statutory language and offers the greatest hope
for inclusion of the structurally and medico-structurally
infertile.
The language in these statutes also presents another
interesting question about the definition of infertility: Can an
individual who has never engaged in intercourse (or not
recently engaged in intercourse) claim to be infertile because he
or she has not procreated? Because this statutory language
does not explicitly require intercourse, but does require
infertility, this issue is unclear.
3. Statutes That Use Spouse Language
Regulations in Hawaii, 90 Maryland, 91 and Texas 92 all
require that a patient’s eggs be fertilized with her spouse’s
sperm and, thus, strictly eliminate the possibility that single or
gay persons can be covered under the mandates. 93 Similarly,
Rhode Island, as discussed above, requires marriage for
coverage under its mandate. 94 Strictly limiting coverage to
those who engage in heterosexual, married relationships,
“[t]here is no question . . . that the [Texas] statute does not
require coverage of assisted reproductive technologies for single
parents or unmarried couples (which encompasses lesbians,
[where] homosexual marriage is not recognized . . . ).” 95
Furthermore, gay couples would not qualify because they
cannot provide both an egg and sperm, as the statutory
wording requires. Unmarried heterosexual persons are also
excluded based on the marriage requirement. In addition,
medico-structurally infertile persons are excluded because of
the spouse language and the requirement of heterosexual
gametes. It is important to note that, regardless of statutory
90. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005).
91. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006).
92. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. Art. 1366.005 (West 2009).
93. Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas all have language in their statutes
which states that insurance need only cover forms of ART where the patient’s
eggs are fertilized with spouse’s sperm. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5
(2005); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006). Similarly, the Rhode
Island statute defines fertility as “the condition of an otherwise healthy
married individual who is unable to conceive.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30
(2008) (emphasis added). This marriage requirement again naturally
eliminates same sex couples and the unmarried.
94. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008).
95. Rank, supra note 7, at 137–38.

2011]

IT’S AN ART NOT A SCIENCE

671

intent, this statutory language removes the possibility of
gamete donation more generally, thus excluding even
heterosexual, married persons who are infertile because of egg
or sperm-based infertility.
4. Statutes That Require Medical or Unexplained Cause of
Infertility
For the state mandate to apply, some states require that
the period of infertility either be unexplained or linked to
certain specific medical conditions that cause infertility. As
Table 1b above shows, statutes in Hawaii, Maryland, and
Texas all contain such language. Interestingly, states with this
requirement are the same states that require a spouse’s sperm
to fertilize an egg, as discussed in the previous section. 96 The
requirement that the cause of infertility be medical or
unexplained automatically eliminates non-medically infertile
gay persons, whose infertility is both explained and not caused
by a medical condition. For unmarried persons without medical
infertility, it is harder to determine whether they would qualify
for unexplained infertility. If they were abstinent, rarely
engaged in intercourse, or engaged in intercourse with multiple
partners, it would arguably be difficult to say that infertility is
unexplained. Those individuals who engage in monogamous,
heterosexual sex, however, would still not qualify in these
states because they are excluded based on the spousal
requirement discussed previously. Furthermore, while medicostructurally infertile persons would qualify under this language
because they have a medical reason for their infertility, they
too would be disqualified in these states because of the spousal
and heterosexual gamete requirements. 97
5. Statutes Which Require that Treatment Be Medically
Necessary
Other states, like Connecticut, Massachusetts, Ohio, and
Rhode Island indicate that the procedure must be “medically

96. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §
15-810 (LexisNexis 2006).
97. The statute in New Jersey is equally problematic. It requires that the
infertility be caused by a disease or condition, without defining what a
condition is. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:48-6x (West 2008). Does a condition mean a
medical condition or an aspect of one’s life (such as having intercourse with a
member of the same sex) which would result in the inability to have children?
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necessary.” 98 Again, statutory interpretation will dictate
whether structurally infertile persons are covered under this
type of statute. If “medically necessary” means that there has
to be a medical cause that requires the treatment, then only
medico-structurally infertile persons would be covered under
the statute. Some argue that fertility treatment is not viewed
as medically necessary for same sex couples because “[b]y
definition, gays and lesbians are not medically infertile, rather,
they are constructively infertile because they do not have
sexual intercourse with members of the opposite sex.” 99 If
interpreted more broadly to include instances where technology
is medically necessary to procreate, however, these types of
statutes would also include those with structural infertility,
regardless of whether because they are single or gay, and ART
would be equally medically necessary for both medically
infertile and constructively infertile persons. Medicostructurally infertile persons, however, definitely qualify under
the medical necessity requirement, provided they can show
medical cause.
The implications of this statutory phrasing have received
some attention in the literature. One scholar has argued that
fertility treatment of gay persons is not medically necessary
because (a) adoption and intercourse with the opposite sex are
potential alternatives, (b) medical insurance should only cover
what is medically legitimate and not what is the foreseeable
result of one’s social choice, (c) medical insurance is intended to
treat dysfunction, which is not present in the socially infertile,
and (d) medical treatments are for medical conditions. 100 In
opposition, another scholar argues that (a) many medical
treatments are available which are not the exclusive cure for a
problem, (b) being gay is not a choice, and, even if it were,
people receive medical care even where the harm caused was a
result of their choice, (c) dysfunction is a fluid concept, and
plenty of legitimate medical treatments address issues other
98. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-536 (West 2007); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 175, § 47H (LexisNexis 2008); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01(A)(1)
(LexisNexis 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 27-18-30 (2008).
99. DeLair, supra note 33, at 175.
100. Rank, supra note 7, at 131–34 (citing Maurice Rickard, PARLIAMENT
OF AUSTRALIA, IS IT MEDICALLY LEGITIMATE TO PROVIDE ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TREATMENTS TO FERTILE LESBIANS AND SINGLE WOMEN? 8
(2000),
available
at
http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/200001/01RP23.pdf).
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than outright dysfunction, and d) medicine is intended to treat
not just conditions, but also symptoms, and, furthermore,
medical treatment is deemed appropriate even in the ten
percent of infertility cases that are unexplained. 101 The issue of
whether gay, unmarried, and medico-structurally infertile
persons’ use of ART is medically necessary deserves further
attention in the future.
Other states like West Virginia have statutes that are very
broad and harder to define. Here, the law requires that HMOs
cover “basic health care services,” which includes “infertility
services.” This breadth of coverage seems to include both the
structurally and medico-structurally infertile. Where a statute
provides little guidance as to which fertility treatments are
covered and for whom, provisions are generally interpreted in
favor of the insured. Courts look to the average person in
determining the reasonable expectations of the insured, leaving
it unclear whether gay, unmarried, or medico-structurally
infertile persons could successfully argue coverage under these
mandates. 102
Table 2 summarizes the results of this section as to which
states are most and least likely to exclude structurally and
medico-structurally infertile persons from coverage under the
mandate, based on the five different statutory requirements. As
the table shows, all of the states implicitly exclude gay and
unmarried persons from coverage or have laws that could
potentially be interpreted in a way that excludes at least some
unmarried or gay persons, with the exception of West Virginia,
which adopted broad statutory language. States like Hawaii,
Maryland, Rhode Island, and Texas use spousal language and
eliminate gamete donation, thereby more directly eliminating
coverage for gay and unmarried persons. Other states’
exclusions are more subtle and less clear, like California’s.
Table 2 suggests that, in most statutory frameworks, medicostructurally infertile persons are also excluded from coverage
for the same reasons, apart from those states like Ohio where
the treatment is covered if it is medically necessary.

101. Rank, supra note 7, at 133–34 (citing Rickard, supra note 100).
102. Minnaert & Tai, supra note 62, at 325–27.
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Table 2: Implications of Statutory Language on
Exclusion of Gay, Unmarried, and Medico-structurally
Infertile Groups by State
Arkansas

Implicit
exclusions
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural

California

Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural

Connecticut

Hawaii

Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural

Illinois

Maryland

Massachusetts

Montana

New Jersey

Potential
exclusions

Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural

No exclusions
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New York

Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay, Unmarried

Ohio
Rhode Island

Texas
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MedicoStructural

Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural
Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural

West Virginia

Gay,
Unmarried,
MedicoStructural

B. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF STATE MANDATES
A brief discussion of the legislative history of these statutes
provides some guidance with respect to states’ intent in
mandating insurance coverage of ART, including whether there
was overt discriminatory exclusion of the structurally infertile.
Session laws and press releases of four states, California,
Maryland, Massachusetts and New Jersey will be explored.
California’s session laws related to its state mandate make
four points: (1) that “[i]nfertility is a significant health problem
that affects millions of Californians,” (2) “[i]nfertility is a
medical illness . . . similar to other illnesses or conditions that
is created by the malfunction of other bodily organs . . . and
should be treated for purposes of insurance the same as any
other body disfunction,” (3) “[i]f properly treated, successful
pregnancies can result in 70 percent of the cases,” and (4)
“[i]nsurance coverage for infertility is uneven, inconsistent, and
frequently subject to arbitrary decisions which are not based on
legitimate medical considerations.” 103
Maryland’s session laws address the obligations of health
maintenance organizations (HMO’s) as insurers. 104 The state
103. 1989 Cal. Stat. 2428.
104. 2000 Md. Laws 1657.
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requires that “[a]n entity . . . provid[ing] pregnancy-related
benefits may not exclude benefits for all outpatient expenses
arising from in vitro fertilization procedures . . . . The
benefits . . . shall be provided [by] health maintenance
organization, to the same extent as the benefits provided for
other infertility services.” 105
The session laws of Massachusetts regarding mandated
insurance coverage for assisted reproduction, entitled An Act to
Promote Cost Containment, Transparency, and Efficiency in
the Provision of Quality Health Insurance for Individuals and
Small Businesses, call for “containment, transparency and
efficiency in the provision of quality health insurance . . . .” 106
Lastly, New Jersey has a relevant press release related to
this matter. New Jersey Governor Donald DiFrancesco released
a statement after the passage of New Jersey statute which
emphasized his personal experiences being a father of three; in
the statement he described “the joys of looking into [his]
newborn child’s eyes for the first time.” 107 He continued that
the “new law will offer those [New Jersey] couples a better
chance of having a baby. A better chance of realizing a dream
many of us take for granted—the dream of becoming a
parent.” 108
There are a number of themes running through these
legislative actions. First, some legislatures, like California, are
medicalizing infertility. It is unknown whether, in
characterizing infertility as a medical issue, the legislature
seeks to overtly exclude those from coverage who suffer from
infertility that is non-medical or whether the legislature simply
does not address or consider the structurally infertile.
Another common theme is the significance of infertility in
terms of both its high incidence and its impact on citizens of the
state. California emphasizes that millions of citizens struggle
with infertility, thus highlighting its import, though it is
unclear whether they include structurally or medico105. Id.
106. An Act to Promote Cost Containment, Transparency, and Efficiency in
the Provision of Quality Health Insurance for Individuals and Small
Businesses, 2010 Mass. Acts 288.
107. News Release, DiFrancesco Signs Law to Provide Health Insurance
Coverage of Infertility, Office of the Governor (Aug. 31, 2001) (on file at the
New Jersey State Library).
108. Id.
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structurally infertile persons. New Jersey, interestingly,
focuses its media release on the social importance of having a
child, a statement which is presumably neutral to marital
status and sexual orientation or otherwise not contemplated.
Some states also focus on the efficacy of treatment as a
justification for mandating coverage, including California. This,
again, constitutes an argument in support of ART coverage that
does not rely on internal factors, like marriage or sexuality.
Similarly, another theme, affordability and/or reduction of
waste (Massachusetts), arguably applies equally to all types of
infertility—medical, structural, or medico-structural. 109
The legislative intent, exhibited in drafting insurance
coverage mandates for ART, supply a useful context when
considering possible discriminatory intent on the part of
legislatures. 110
The next section will discuss some of the legal, ethical, and
policy considerations raised by state-mandated insurance
statutes and their implications for gay, unmarried, and medicostructurally infertile people.
IV. DISCUSSION
State-mandated insurance coverage for ART has unique
legal and ethical implications for the structurally and medicostructurally infertile. These mandates arise from recognition of
the emotional toll of untreated infertility and a desire to
increase access to these expensive technologies. 111 However,

109. Here, it is difficult to predict what types of waste the legislatures may
have meant in the context of ART. However, data supports the notion that
where insurance covers ART, multiple births (and thus the overwhelming
costs associated with prenatal and maternal care in this context) are reduced.
Georgina M. Chambers et al., The Economic Impact of Assisted Reproductive
Technology: A Review of Developed Countries, 91 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2281,
2292 (2009).One potential reason for this may be that, in IVF cases, women
choose to implant higher numbers of embryos in instances where they are
paying out of pocket, in hopes of minimizing the number of ART cycles they
undergo. Id. Additionally, insurance coverage could prevent waste because full
coverage allows for individuals to go for the most effective treatment, rather
than multiple attempts at various less-effective treatments. See Pendo, supra
note 11, at 342 (explaining that plans with certain ART exclusions may cause
patients to undergo less effective treatment simply because the less effective
treatments are covered rather than undergo the more effective treatments
that are excluded).
110. See infra Part IV.B.2.
111. Numerous studies link infertility with depression and lesser wellbeing in women and men. See e.g. Alice D. Domar et al., The Prevalence and
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state mandates have done little to ensure access for gay and
unmarried persons including those who, like the individuals
that the laws aim to protect, have a medical cause for their
infertility. Indeed, many state mandates are structured in such
a way as to determine coverage specifically on the basis of
marital status (and, by proxy, sexual orientation), a
prerequisite period of unprotected intercourse (again,
implicating sexual orientation), and/or the existence of a
medical condition or particular type of medical condition. Given
procreative liberty considerations, high rates of use of ART by
gay and unmarried persons, and the fact that ART is the sole
means of procreation for some of these individuals, it is
important to explore the consequences of these mandates for
the structurally and medico-structurally infertile.
The implicit exclusion of gay, unmarried, and medicostructurally infertile persons from state-mandated insurance
coverage of ART, raises three particular legal challenges:
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenges, Equal
Protection challenges, and Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) challenges.
A. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS CONSIDERATIONS
1. Fourteenth Amendment Legal Constructs
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
declares that no State shall “deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law.” 112 From this
protection of human liberty springs a right to privacy, and
“only personal rights deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty’ are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy.” 113 Using notions of privacy and fundamental
rights, the Fourteenth Amendment has often been used as a
talisman in the battle over reproductive freedom and choice.
Although a positive right to assisted reproduction has not yet
and may never be articulated by the courts, there exist a
Predictability of Depression in Infertile Women, 58 FERTILITY & STERILITY
1158 (1992); Reija Klemetti et al., Infertility, Mental Disorders and WellBeing—a Nationwide Survey, 89 ACTA OBSTETRICIA ET GYNECOLOGICA
SCANDINAVICA 677 (2010).
112. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
113. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
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number of cases that protect a certain level of reproductive
freedom, particularly in freedoms from unwanted intervention
by the state in the realm of family and childbearing.
One of the first U.S. Supreme Court cases to deal with
procreative liberty was Buck v. Bell, an early 20th century case
in which the Court upheld a statute mandating compulsory
sterilization of “mental defectives.” 114 Attorneys for Carrie
Buck argued that mandated sterilization was in violation of her
due process right to procreate, but the Court ultimately likened
compulsory sterilization to that of compulsory vaccination and
held it to be in the state’s interest to have her sterilized. 115 The
concept of a due process right to procreation evolved with
Skinner v. Oklahoma, in which the Supreme Court held that a
statute allowing for the sterilization of repeat felons was
invalid based on the idea that there is a due process right to
reproduce “which is basic to the perpetuation of a race.” 116
Further shedding light on the boundaries and privileges of
reproductive choice, the Court held in Griswold v. Connecticut
that the same due process protections that shield persons from
involuntary sterilization also afford one the right to choose to
prevent pregnancy by using contraception. 117 Seven years later,
the Court extended that same protection to individuals who are
not married by stating that “[i]f the right of privacy means
anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters
so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to
bear or beget a child.” 118 Thus, the right to engage in
procreation and sex, regardless of marital status, was protected
under the Due Process Clause and notions of sexual intercourse
for reproductive purposes began to pull away from notions of
sexual intercourse for other reasons. As one scholar
summarized it, these court cases all “stand for a constitutional
right to procreate regardless of marital status.” 119 Landmark
cases like Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey

114. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
115. Id.
116. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536 (1942).
117. This case held that it was unconstitutional to ban the use of
contraceptives for married persons under a penumbra rights theory under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
118. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
119. DeLair, supra note 33, at 178.
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further evidenced a strong commitment of the Court to defining
procreative autonomy as grounded in due process privacy
protections. 120 Further, a woman’s right to choose abortion
“irrespective of her marital status” has been interpreted as
further bolstering the concept that procreative rights and
freedoms are grounded in the individual, not the married
couple. 121
To date, the court system has mainly framed the due
process privacy rights related to procreation as negative rights,
meaning a right to be free from government intervention into
the individual’s procreative activities. 122 This is distinguishable
from a positive right to procreate, where the government would
be obligated to provide one with the means necessary to do
so. 123 Though courts have made no clear ruling on this matter,
cases like Harris v. McRae, 124 where the Court held that
women had no positive right to financial assistance from the
government in order to procure an abortion despite having a
negative right to an abortion, demonstrate a “reluctance to
extend the right to procreate” into the realm of positive
obligations. 125 Given this unwillingness to acknowledge a
positive right to procreate in more traditional senses, courts are
even less likely to declare a positive right to high-tech,
expensive, and third-party-dependent interventions like ART
because where it would be more challenging for a court to
120. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153. (1973). (“The right of privacy, whether
it be founded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and
restrictions upon state action . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”); Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992) (“Roe is clearly
in no jeopardy, since subsequent constitutional developments have neither
disturbed, nor do they threaten to diminish, the scope of recognized protection
accorded to the liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family, and
decisions about whether or not to beget or bear a child.”).
121. Note, Reproductive Technology and the Procreation Rights of the
Unmarried, 98 HARV. L. REV. 669, 677 (1985) [hereinafter Procreation Rights].
122. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
123. Though scholars like John Robertson have examined to what extent
reproductive liberty has or is worthy of greater protections, this paper will not
focus on these issues. Instead, it focuses on what legal arguments can be made
even if reproductive freedom is viewed more narrowly as a negative right with
lesser government protection. For more information on the debate around
expanded reproductive protections, see JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1994).
124. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
125. DeLair, supra note 33, at 179.
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ensure that individuals were given the means necessary to
reproduce.
Despite the courts’ apparent reluctance to broaden the
scope of privacy rights around reproduction, some scholars
assert that courts already view access to assisted reproductive
technology as a fundamental right because, while it is
historically new, it “subsumes several aspects of liberty that
have a long history of constitutional protection” including
contraception, abortion, and sterilization. 126 On the other hand,
some scholars argue that there will be no fundamental right to
ART because, while contraceptive and abortion cases have
involved the removal of something from one’s body, which
invokes the protection of bodily integrity, ART involves
requesting that something be done to one’s body. 127 This
distinction between “freedom from unwanted bodily invasions
and freedom to obtain bodily invasions” separates ART from
other rights granted under the fundamental right of
procreation. 128
2. Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Implications for StateMandated Insurance Coverage of ART and Structural and
Medico-Structural Infertility
Given the unsettled state of the law in this arena, as well
as the signs of reluctance within the courts to broadly construe
reproductive rights, it is unlikely that a structurally or medicostructurally infertile person would succeed in a claim that a
state-mandated insurance statute violated his due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Though the government is obligated not to interfere with
an individual’s right to reproduce, this obligation is likely not
violated by the state mandates of insurance coverage for ART.
No federal law requires that individuals have access to ART,
and, as such, states are acting above their obligations in
ensuring that certain members of the population have access to
ART. Regardless of whether these mandates result in unequal
distribution of or costs for ART across differing marital
statuses and sexual orientation, they are not outright denying
any individual access to ART. Instead, they are providing a

126. Rhadika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1463 (2008).
127. Id. at 1465.
128. Id.
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positive right to some, but not others. Thus, the state action of
mandating insurance for ART is distinguishable from cases like
Griswold 129 and Eisenstadt, 130 where the government was
acting to prohibit or prevent access for individuals.
Even where the special protections to certain groups like
unmarried persons or gay persons are considered, a right to
assisted reproduction is still not afforded. For example,
Eisenstadt spoke to the idea that unmarried individuals cannot
be treated differently than married individuals with respect to
state interference in reproduction or sexual practices. 131
However, while the holding in Eisenstadt is interpreted to
mean that the unmarried have a right to engage in intercourse
without procreative intent, this protection does not necessarily
extend to a right to have insurance pay for them to use ART.
Cases dealing particularly with homosexual rights to
privacy in sexual activity also do not seem to ensure insurance
coverage of ART. In a landmark case for gay rights, Lawrence v.
Texas, the Supreme Court held that the right to adult,
consensual intercourse is protected under the due process right
of privacy, and, thus, anti-sodomy laws are illegal. 132 In
essence, the case held that gay men have as much right to
privacy in sexual activity as everyone else, even where the
sexual activity is engaged in for purposes other than
reproduction. 133 Again, however, this case speaks to a negative
right that the government not interfere in one’s sexual
practices, not a positive right for the state to enable those
practices.
Instances of medico-structural infertility meet the same
barriers. As with infertile heterosexual married couples, the
law has yet to afford the positive right to procreate, and it

129. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965).
130. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
131. Id. at 453.
132. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 558 (2003).
133. Id. at 578
The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent
from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual
lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives.
The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by
making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in
their conduct without intervention of the government.”
Id.
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follows that there is no right to ART yet evoked. Irrespective of
whether unmarried, gay, or medico-structurally infertile
persons are the group being excluded by law, a state
government is currently under no obligation to provide access
to ART for anyone and, thus, can act to provide access to some
and not others without infringing on the due process privacy
rights of its citizens. State mandates that implicitly exclude
these groups either by requiring marriage, unprotected sex, or
medical necessity are not in violation of the Due Process Clause
under current interpretations of the law. This does not mean
that a court can never find a due process privacy right being
infringed upon by state-mandated insurance coverage of ART
on behalf of the structurally infertile. Rather, current law and
current behaviors of the courts tend to suggest that this
freedom would not be recognized at this point in time. As
notions of reproductive freedom continue to develop and as
technologies like ART continue to become more mainstream,
courts may more readily be willing to acknowledge a positive
right of reproduction and even ART. If such a positive right
were recognized, it would reinforce claims that a state mandate
excluding groups with structural or medico-structural
infertility from mandated insurance is a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process violation.
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT EQUAL PROTECTION
CONSIDERATIONS
1. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Legal Constructs
Another potential area where claims of unequal access to
reproductive technology may be raised is through the Equal
Protection Clause, which requires equal treatment of those who
are similarly situated. The Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause requires that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.” 134 Equal Protection claims can involve three different
levels of scrutiny—strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
rational basis scrutiny—depending on the basis by which the
challenged law classifies people. 135 The highest level of
scrutiny, strict scrutiny, is applied to laws that implicate
fundamental rights or that use so-called “suspect

134. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
135. DeLair, supra note 33 at 181.
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classifications” based on race, national origin, or religion. Strict
scrutiny requires that the government demonstrate that the
law and its use of classifications are necessary to serve a
compelling state interest and are narrowly tailored to be as
least restrictive on individual rights as possible. 136
Intermediate scrutiny is applied to challenges of a law’s
constitutionality based on its use of “quasi-suspect
classifications” of gender or illegitimacy and requires that the
government prove that the classification serves an important
state interest to which the classification is substantially
related. 137 Most equal protection claims are subject to a
rational basis standard where the law does not implicate a
fundamental right or use suspect or quasi-suspect
classifications, as is the case with marriage status, sexual
orientation, and disability. For a law having discriminatory
effects on these bases to be found unconstitutional under
rational basis review, the challenger must show that the law is
not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 138
Furthermore, violations of Equal Protection do not always
require that the law classify a group and discriminate on its
face. As shown in Washington v. Davis, violations of equal
protection are also present where there is evidence of
discriminatory intent. 139 Importantly, “a law or other official
act is [not] unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disproportionate impact . . . . Disproportionate impact is not
irrelevant, but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious
racial discrimination forbidden by the Constitution.” 140 To
prove discriminatory intent, it must be shown that the law was
enacted to lead to a particular discriminatory result—a
discriminatory side-effect or consequence of the law is
insufficient. 141 For example, discriminatory intent could be
proven by showing that “the discrimination is very difficult to
explain on nonracial grounds.” 142
Courts have examined issues of reproductive equality in
many of the same cases discussed in the previous section,
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976).
Id. at 230, 242.
Id.
Id.
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though these cases have been specific to laws directly
interfering with the rights of certain people to exercise
reproductive freedom. The courts’ positions in these cases,
however, still provide a starting point from which to consider
how a court might go about performing a rational basis review
for an Equal Protection claim in the instance of state insurance
mandates for ART. For example, in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 143
the Supreme Court struck down the compulsory sterilization
law because “it discriminated between chicken thieves and
embezzlers.” 144 The Court elaborates that “strict scrutiny of the
classification which a State makes in a sterilization law is
essential,
lest
unwittingly,
or
otherwise,
invidious
discriminations are made against groups or types of individuals
in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal
laws.” 145 One scholar has argued that, based on this holding,
“[a] law that prohibits ARTs under some circumstances, but not
others, must at the very least be based upon a legitimate
governmental interest in order to be constitutional.” 146
Examining the holdings in Eisenstadt 147 (where the Court
struck down a law that discriminated between married and
non-married persons with respect to contraception) and
Lawrence v. Texas 148 (where the Court struck down a law
forbidding homosexual, but not heterosexual, sodomy) the
scholar further argues that:
a law limiting ARTs to married persons or to heterosexual persons
should fail because it would treat the very same act—the use of a
particular technology—differently based upon the marital status or
sexual preference of the persons involved, with no real basis for the
distinction other than societal disapproval or prejudice. 149

These issues become highly complex when the discrimination is
non-facial, as is often the case in state-mandated insurance
coverage of ART.
Specifically with respect to unmarried persons and their
use of reproductive technology, one scholar has argued strongly

143. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
144. Rao, supra note 126, at 1474.
145. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
146. Rao, supra note 126, at 1475.
147. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
148. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
149. Rao, supra note 126, at 1475–76. This argument was used to challenge
an Italian law which facially discriminated against gay, unmarried person in
distribution of ART. Id. at 1476.
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for heightened scrutiny in Equal Protection claims. 150 Arguing
that the state has an interest in protecting “legitimate family
relationships,” the author writes that “both marital and
nonmarital families can foster the familial values the
Constitution seeks to protect . . . .” “[C]ertain ‘objective
characteristics’—blood relationship with their children,
parental duty to support those children, parental intention to
form a family . . . should locate their families at the intimate
end of the relationship ‘spectrum,’” thus ensuring them
heightened equal protection review. 151 This argument can
naturally be extended to gay persons wishing to procreate via
ART as well.
2. Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Implications for
State-Mandated Insurance Coverage of ART and Structural
and Medico-Structural Infertility
To prove that any of the state-mandated insurance statutes
violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause is
a challenging endeavor. Most of the statutes do not, on their
face, discriminate on the basis of a classification. Of the five
different categories of language shown in Tables 1a and 1b,
only those statutes that use spousal language could be
considered facially discriminatory because they require that
eligible participants be spouses, implying that only married
individuals qualify under the law. The remaining types of
statutes, while they may have discriminatory effects, do not
contain any facially discriminatory language.
Though marriage has been viewed as a fundamental right
in the courts, state mandates with marriage requirements do
not put discriminatory barriers in front of the right to marry. 152
Rather, they provide certain privileges to those who are
married and are, thus, more akin to cases like Eisenstadt. 153 In
addressing equal protection issues in Eisenstadt, the Court
performed a rational basis analysis and overturned the
Massachusetts law for “providing dissimilar treatment for
married and unmarried persons.” 154 In Eisenstadt, the state
150. Procreation Rights, supra note 121, at 680.
151. Id. at 679–80.
152. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978); Loving v
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
153. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
154. Id. at 454.
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argued that one justification for the differing treatment of nonmarried persons with respect to contraception was to diminish
instances of premarital sex. 155 Similarly, laws in Hawaii, 156
Maryland, 157 and Texas 158 treat those who are married
differently from those who are not in matters related to
procreation and reproductive choice and may be handled
similarly to Eisenstadt in a court. However, the state interest of
reducing premarital sex would be irrelevant because these
state mandates do not involve sexual intercourse but rather
reproduction without intercourse.
The other four statutory constructs do not facially
discriminate on the basis of marriage or sexual orientation;
therefore, discriminatory intent would need to be proven in
order for an Equal Protection claim to succeed. As Tables 1a,
1b, and 2 suggest, 159 statutory language in some states appears
more definitive and intentional in its exclusion of unmarried or
gay persons than that of others. For example, a requirement of
medical necessity seems to seek to exclude structurally infertile
people (that is, unmarried or gay persons who are
reproductively healthy but require gamete donation and/or
artificial insemination to procreate) if medical necessity is
understood to mean medical infertility. 160 The same result is
true for requirements that the infertility be either medically
related or unexplained. Similarly, laws requiring a period of
unprotected intercourse may have the effect of excluding gay
people who do not engage in intercourse with a member of the
opposite sex. 161 For these types of statutes, it would not be
enough to prove that the statute results in differing outcomes
or treatment for gay or unmarried persons than for married,
heterosexual persons. Rather, it would have to be proven that it
was the state’s intent to exclude these groups purposefully from
coverage for discriminatory reasons and, further, that the state
does not have a rational basis for the law.
In determining discriminatory intent, as Davis suggests, a

155. Id. at 448.
156. HAW. REV. STAT. § 431:10A-116.5 (2005).
157. MD. INS. CODE ANN. § 15-810 (LexisNexis 2006).
158. TEX. INS. CODE § 1366.005 (West 2009).
159. See supra Parts III, III.A.5.
160. DeLair, supra note 33, at 175.
161. See Rank, supra note 7, at 139 (explaining that although legislatures
likely did not “intend[] to extend coverage to lesbian couples, it is conceivable
that the language . . . be construed to include such couples”).
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law could be struck down by the Equal Protection Clause if the
reason for distinguishing two groups could be no other reason
than discriminatory purposes. 162 The legislative histories
explored earlier in the paper provide some guidance here.
Those states which medicalize infertility might arguably be
accused of having discriminatory intent to exclude gay and
unmarried people, by focusing only on medical infertility, thus
excluding only those kinds of infertility which gay and
unmarried people experience. However, this interpretation is
unlikely because it can also be said that California simply did
not contemplate the structurally infertile in its laws or found
medical infertility to be the better target of mandated health
insurance coverage. Interestingly, California is not one of the
states requiring that the infertility be either medically
explained or medically necessary, as shown in Tables 1a and
The other factors predominant in the legislative
1b. 163
histories (significance of infertility, efficacy of treatment,
affordability, and waste reduction) are neutral to sexual
orientation and marital status. While this suggests that
legislative histories are unlikely to unveil discriminatory
intent, it also suggests that the legislatures should not object,
based on their goals of the law, to coverage for
structurally/medico-structurally infertile persons. This is
because the reasons for implementing the laws arguably apply
as soundly to these types of infertility. 164
Whether the state’s interest in excluding gay and
unmarried persons from coverage has a rational basis must
also be considered. One interest states might argue is that the
purpose of the mandates is to exclude from coverage those
heterosexual people who are able to reproduce naturally, thus
preserving resources. 165 Similarly, a state might argue that
coverage should only be provided for those people who likely
require more expensive ART interventions that they may not
be able to afford without insurance coverage (likely the

162. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
163. See supra Part III.
164. It is important to note that the study of legislative histories here is not
exhaustive. More in-depth research could in fact reveal evidence of
discriminatory intent by some states.
165. See In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099 (stating that
mandates, in general, can be viewed as having “the effect of diverting already
scarce health care resources to one particular health problem”).
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medically infertile) but that coverage should exclude those who
require less expensive interventions like artificial insemination
which they might be able to afford out-of-pocket. A true
analysis of the validity of these interests requires economic
analysis which is outside the scope of this work. However, it is
important to note that furthering these interests does not
require completely excluding gay and unmarried persons.
Rather, the laws could simply be modified to state that only
persons who are unable to reproduce naturally are covered
and/or additionally that only those procedures which cannot be
achieved by less expensive means are covered.
States might also argue an interest in preserving the
status of marriage and traditional families or, on a related
note, argue the necessity of safeguarding children’s “emotional
and psychological wellbeing,” which they would suggest was
compromised by having a single or gay parent(s). 166 This is a
common argument advanced by states in past cases about
custody and adoption rights of gay and unmarried persons.
While it has had some historical success, more recent cases and
statutes suggest a growing tolerance where most courts would
no longer recognize this as a compelling argument for excluding
these groups from parenting. 167
A long history exists regarding the struggle for single
persons and gay persons seeking custody of children born via
ART. Central to this history is the inability of gay persons to
legally marry, the belief that gay persons are involved in shortterm relationships, as well as the belief that gay persons and
single persons are inadequate at parenting children. 168
Research, however, does not support either the notion that gay
people cannot maintain stable relationships or that single and
166. See DeLair, supra note 33, at 181–82.
167. See cases cited infra note 174.
168. See e.g. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted
Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324, 332 (2005) (noting
that the same-sex marriage debate is linked to the current access to ART
controversy and furthering “that gays and lesbians are equally competent
parents and that their children are as well-adjusted as other children”). Gay
marriage is currently legal in six states (Connecticut, California, Iowa,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont) as well as the District of
Columbia. The issue got recent attention in 2010, when California courts
overturned Proposition 8 and again permitted gay persons to marry in the
state. Judge Gives Green Light for Same-Sex Marriage in California, CNN
(Aug.
12,
2010),
http://articles.cnn.com/2010-0812/us/california.same.sex.ruling_1_marriage-last-week-couples-caseheads?_s=PM:US.
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homosexual parenting is less effective than heterosexual,
married parenting. 169
In the past, many courts and legislatures objected to or
simply did not contemplate gay and unmarried persons in the
role of parents, whether through adoption or through custodial
rights. One example is the original Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), promulgated in 1973, which simply did not discuss
unmarried women’s use of ART, “leaving them vulnerable to
parental claims by [gamete] donors.” 170 Since then, however,
the 2002 UPA has been updated to treat married and
unmarried parents equally. 171 Likewise, all of the states who
have mandated insurance coverage of ART also provide
adoption rights to gay persons and single persons by statute. 172
169. For example, studies support the idea that heterosexual and
homosexual relationships can be equally stable or unstable and long or short
term. Susan Golombok et al., Children in Lesbian and Single-Parent
Households: Psychosexual and Psychiatric Appraisal, 24 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. &
PSYCHIATRY 551, 553 (1983) (“[I]t seems doubtful whether transience is any
more characteristic of lesbian relationships than of women’s heterosexual
relationships.”); Charlotte J. Patterson, Children of Lesbian and Gay Parents,
63 CHILD DEV. 1025, 1025 (1992) (finding “no evidence that the development
of children with lesbian or gay parents is compromised in any significant
respect relative to that among children of heterosexual parents in otherwise
comparable circumstances”); Daniel Goleman, Studies Find No Disadvantage
in Growing Up in a Gay Home, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1992, at C14
170. Ellen Waldman, Cultural Priorities Revealed: The Development and
Regulation of Assisted Reproduction in the United States and Israel, 16
HEALTH MATRIX 65, 92 (2006); See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note, 9B
U.L.A. 378, 378–79 (1973.)
171. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, Prefatory Note (2002), available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm#TOC1_1.
172. For a comprehensive exploration of all state statutes in this area, see
In Your State, LAMBDA LEGAL, http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions/
(last visited March 29, 2011). It is important to note that, for gay couples,
adoption rights are important but second parent adoptions, which enable the
non-genetically related partner to adopt the child, are also key. The statutes
which permit adoption by gay persons are as follows: Arkansas permits “[a]n
unmarried adult” to adopt, ARK. CODE ANN. §9-9-204 (2009); in California,
“[a]ny a prospective adoptive parent . . . [must] be at least 10 years older than
the child,” CAL. FAM. CODE § 8601 (West 2004); Connecticut allows for
consideration of ”the capacity of the prospective adoptive parents to meet such
needs [particular needs of child]” but does not have specific adoption
restrictions based on sexual orientation, CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-726 (West
2004); in Hawaii, “[a]ny proper adult person, not married, or any person
married to the legal father or mother of a minor child, or a husband and wife
jointly” may petition for adoption, HAW. REV. STAT. § 578-1 (2006); in Illinois,
“[a] reputable person of legal age and of either sex” may adopt a child, 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 50/2 (2011); Maryland courts consider “all factors necessary to
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Additionally, while historically there has been strong case law
which did not welcome single parents; this has begun to change
in the courts. 173 In cases which grant custody or adoption rights
to gay persons, the courts have focused on the best interests of
the child and have concluded either that the inclusion of the
single or gay parent supports these interests, or at a minimum,
that the sexual orientation alone cannot proscribe custody
without some other evidence of actual harm to the child from
the sexual orientation of the parent or from another reason. 174
Thus, overall, courts and legislatures in most states are
becoming open to the idea of single and gay persons as parents,
making it unlikely in the majority of states that fitness to
parent or traditional models of family could be used as a
rational basis for excluding these groups from mandated
coverage of ART.
Other state interests may vary depending on the types of
treatment being excluded. As one example, the spousal
requirement may be intended to exclude gamete donors. Here,
the state might argue that insurance companies cannot be
expected to handle additional expenses of gamete donation, in

determine the prospective adoptee’s best interests” and cannot deny “petition
solely because petitioner . . . is single or unmarried,” MD. CODE ANN., FAM.
LAW § 5-3B-19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2010); Massachusetts requires only “[a]
person of full age,” MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 210, §1 (LexisNexis 2003); in
Montana, “an unmarried” adult may adopt, MONT. CODE ANN. 42-1-106
(2009); in New Jersey, “[a]ny [adult] person” may adopt, N.J. STAT. ANN. 9:343 (West 2002); New York requires “[a]n adult unmarried person,” N. Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2010); Ohio requires, “[a]n unmarried adult,” Ohio
Rev. Code Ann. §3107.03 (LexisNexis 2008); in Rhode Island, “[a]ny person”
may adopt, R.I. GEN. LAWS §15-7-4 (2003); in Texas, “any adult” may adopt,
TEX. FAM. CODE. ANN. §162.001 (West 2008); and in West Virginia, “[a]ny
person not married” may adopt, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-201 (LexisNexis
2009).
173. For an excellent overview of the cases denying women as single
parents in favor of inclusion of donor fathers, see Waldman, supra note 170, at
92–96.
174. In re Marriage of Birdsall, 197 Cal. App. 3d 1024, 1031 (Cal. Ct. App.
1988) (“Evidence of one parent's homosexuality, without a link to detriment to
the child, is insufficient to constitute harm."); Teegarden v. Teegarden, 642
N.E.2d 1007, 1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) ("[H]omosexuality standing alone
without evidence of any adverse effect upon the welfare of the child does not
render the homosexual parent unfit as a matter of law to have custody of the
child.") (emphasis added); Boswell v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 662, 674 (Md. 1998)
(“[W]e agree with those courts from other jurisdictions that have held that the
primary consideration in . . . custody proceedings is not the sexual lifestyle or
conduct of the parent, but whether the child will suffer harm from the
behavior of the parent . . . .”).
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addition to the other services they are providing or that gamete
donation is against the policies of the state. However, these
types of limitations, if valid, can again simply be altered by
specifying this in the statue; thus removing gamete donation
but not also excluding unmarried and gay persons.
Despite the willingness of courts and legislatures to
recognize the structurally infertile as appropriate parents,
equal protection challenges here still remain difficult unless
discriminatory intent can be proven. Equal protection
challenges would be strongest when brought against the state
mandates with spousal language because there is some
evidence of unequal treatment surrounding the fundamental
right of marriage. While such an equal protection challenge
could be complex, it does present a stronger challenge to statemandated insurance coverage than Due Process challenges,
particularly where the statutes discriminate facially on the
basis of marriage.
C. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT CONSIDERATIONS
1. ADA Legal Constructs
Another potential claim with respect to state-mandated
insurance for ART is the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) 175 and its respective legal claims. Specifically, Title II of
the ADA deals with government violations. Title II applies to
“any State or local government,” which includes state
legislatures in their role of making laws. 176
Title II provides that no “qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from
participation in or be denied the benefits of the services,
programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
discrimination by any such entity.” 177 A person has a disability
under the ADA if he or she has a “physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,” has “a record of such an impairment,” or is
“regarded as having such an impairment.” 178 Infertility was

175.
176.
177.
178.

Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006).
Id. §§ 12131(1)(A).
Id. § 12132.
Id. § 12102(1).
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famously held to be disability in Bragdon v. Abbott where the
Supreme Court ordered that reproduction was a major life
activity when an HIV-positive patient brought suit against a
dentist who refused to perform certain dental procedures on
her in his office. 179 The Court stated that “[r]eproduction and
the sexual dynamics surrounding it are central to the life
process itself,” 180 and “found that the HIV infection
substantially limited her ability to reproduce and bear children,
thus drawing protection under the ADA.” 181 More recently, the
ADA Amendments of 2008 listed reproductive functions as a
major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. 182
Under Title II a qualified individual with a disability is “an
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
modifications to rules, policies, or practices . . . meets the
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or
the participation in programs or activities provided by a public
entity.” 183 Thus, a) modification to rules and policies is one way
in which a public entity like a state must accommodate a
person with a disability and b) that modification need only be
made if it is reasonable. The state must make these reasonable
modifications to policies to avoid discrimination on the basis of
disability unless it can be demonstrated “that making the
modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the
service, program, or activity.” 184 Under this provision, a state
statute which excluded a woman with both multiple sclerosis
and schizophrenia from a state program that helped enable
physically disabled persons to live at home did not to violate

179. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
180. Id. at 638.
181. Jessica L. Hawkins, Separating Fact from Fiction: Mandated
Insurance Coverage of Infertility Treatments, 23 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 203,
210 (2007).
182. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, available at
http://www.access-board.gov/about/laws/ada-amendments.htm.
For
a
discussion of the legal and ethical considerations which led to infertility being
considered a disability requiring reasonable accommodation as well as how
this is supported by Equal Employment Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC)
guidelines, see Sandra M. Tomkowicz, The Disabling Effects of Infertility:
Fertile Grounds for Accommodating Infertile Couples Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1996).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 12131.
184. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130 (2011).
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the ADA. 185 In Easley, the woman was not able to participate in
the program because she was not mentally alert. 186 The court
did not think it a reasonable modification to the policy to
include her through use of a surrogate decision-maker because
mental alertness is a necessary prerequisite for the services to
be provided. 187 The court clarified that this is not case of
discrimination against a group or sub-group because of
disability. “On the contrary, this is a case where an additional
handicap . . . renders participation in the program
ineffectual.” 188 Quoting another case, the court added that
there is no requirement that “any benefit extended to one
category of handicapped persons also be extended to all other
categories of handicapped persons.” 189 In another case from the
same circuit, Juvelis, a mentally disabled boy was allowed to be
included in special benefits for the mentally disabled, even
though he was not able to declare his domicile—which was part
of the process to qualify for the program—because making an
exception would not modify the essential nature of the
program. 190 The court reasoned that the program was intended
for people with that particular type of disability and his
inability to determine his domicile did not disrupt the
objectives of the program or alter his ability to participate in
the program. 191
2. ADA Implications for State-Mandated Insurance Coverage
of ART and Structural and Medico-Structural Infertility
The ADA and case law like Bragdon make clear that
reproductive function is a major life activity and the inability to
reproduce is a disability under the ADA. There is still, however,
a question as to what this means for structurally and medicostructurally infertile individuals. Reproduction is a major life
activity for gay and unmarried persons, regardless of whether
their infertility is solely structural or both medical and

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Easley ex rel. Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297 (3d. Cir. 1994).
Id. at 299.
Id. at 306.
Id.
Id. at 305, (citing Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 548 (1987)).
Juvelis ex rel. Juvelis v. Snider, 68 F.3d 648, 656 (3rd Cir. 1995).
Id.
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structural. However, Bragdon would likely not support the
premise that gay or unmarried persons with healthy
reproductive function are disabled under the meaning of the
ADA. 192 For medico-structurally infertile persons, the reason
for which they cannot reproduce is linked to a physical
impairment, as well as a structural one. Thus, under the ADA,
medico-structurally infertile persons should qualify as disabled
like other people with medical-based infertility. 193 While
persons with structural infertility are limited in this major life
activity as well, it is not due to a physical impairment and thus,
though ultimately a matter for the legislature and the courts,
does not likely fall under the meaning of a disability under the
ADA.
While accommodation by modifying state mandates to
include medico-structural infertility is a possibility, another
question is whether a court would find this reasonable, or more
specifically, whether such a modification would fundamentally
alter the nature of the services. For those states which have
some medical component built into the mandate (Connecticut,
Hawaii, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, and
Texas) or for those states that have medicalization as part of
their legislative intent (California) it appears that medicostructurally infertile people would fare very similar to the
plaintiff in the Juvelis case. The fact that these individuals
may have to go through extra steps to establish medical
infertility does not seem to alter the fundamental purpose of
the statute, which is to provide insurance coverage for
procedures dealing with medical infertility. They are still

192. Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
193. Interestingly, however, while same sex couples or unmarried people
may not be able to show that a physical impairment prevents the ability to
reproduce, as in Bragdon, with HIV they may be able to satisfy the substantial
limitation prong. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 624. In Bragdon, a woman with HIV
was viewed as substantially impaired with regards to her ability to procreate
because she was HIV positive and was unable to find an individual willing to
procreate with her. Id. Thus, while she had a medical condition, it was more
the fact that she could not find a partner to procreate with (indirectly a result
of her illness) which made her infertile, not an actual medical condition that
prevented her reproductive system from working. In this way, unmarried
persons could be argued to be infertile if they cannot find a partner with whom
they wish to procreate, or same-sex couples could be viewed as infertile
because they are not naturally able to produce children. However, the fact that
unmarried persons and same sex couples would not have a medical condition
that caused their constructive infertility would likely bar them from protection
under the ADA.
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qualified individuals with the same disability for which the
state is providing services and the fact that they are gay or
unmarried does not render these services ineffectual if
treatment will work for them. Unlike Easley, this reading of the
statute does not open the gates for people with other
disabilities to be included, but instead solely sticks to the
disability of infertility.
As one court put it, the purpose of the ADA is to deal both
with invidious discrimination of those with disabilities and also
sheer indifference and apathy. 194 States without mandates for
the medico-structurally infertile may not have adequately
considered their exclusion from coverage because these groups
are often not infertile in the same way as the medically
infertile. However, the medico-structurally infertile nonetheless
benefit from the same treatments and insurance coverage as
the medically infertile. Denying them coverage in this way
would be akin to denying seeing eye dogs for persons who are
blind because of a congenital defect but providing seeing eye
dogs to those with trauma-related blindness. If both are equally
blind and require the use of a seeing eye dog, then why should
the origin of the disability matter? However, in these states, a
court may view the difference between medically and medicostructurally infertile individuals more akin to Easley because, if
the intent of the law was to treat medical infertility, other
forms of infertility may alter the nature of the coverage in some
way. In this case, the state would need to advance an adequate
argument for why this inclusion would go against the purpose
of the policy.
For those states which do not have some medical mandate
in their statutes, it is less clear what the intent of the laws
were and thus it is harder to see whether inclusion of medicostructurally infertile would alter the original purpose of the
program. However, the same values and considerations
articulated above would apply. While the ADA does not call for
similar treatment of all people with different types of
disabilities, it does call for similar treatment of persons with
the same disability under a given program or policy. Thus there
should be equivalent treatment of the same condition of
infertility regardless of origin under a given law.
In summary, constitutional and ADA protections in the
194. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296–97 (1985).
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areas of reproductive freedom and assisted reproduction, as
well as state-mandated insurance for these treatments, are
somewhat complex, unclear, and still developing. While many
of the state mandates do not appear to violate constitutional
and other legal protections explicitly, there are a few troubling
areas. For example, some of the mandates, such as those
requiring marriage or those requiring medical or unexplained
causes for infertility, may be vulnerable to Equal Protection
challenges. Likewise, those statutes that exclude medicostructurally infertile persons may be susceptible to ADA
claims. These legal concerns, along with other important
ethical and practical considerations discussed in the next
section, raise important questions for policymakers, legislators,
and academics about the purpose and goal of state-mandated
insurance coverage of ART and the role of the state therein.
D. PRACTICAL AND ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND COMPETING
INTERESTS IN STATE-MANDATED INSURANCE COVERAGE OF ART
As the catalogue of state mandates that require insurance
coverage of ART suggests, though it may be unwritten or often
unacknowledged, these statutes mainly intend to promote
heterosexual, monogamous, married family development.
Between the lines, gay and single persons are excluded from
being ensured the same fertility benefits as other individuals.
While state statutes may leave out gay and unmarried persons
from coverage, these individuals depend on ART to reproduce
genetically-related offspring, and ART is growing increasingly
popular as a way of making family life possible. However, the
issue of state-mandated insurance coverage for infertility, both
generally and in the context of gay and unmarried persons, is
contextually situated within a number of other concerns such
as healthcare justice and resource allocation, religious and
political issues, and health insurance purpose and theory. To
better understand how best to move forward with addressing
the fertility needs of gay and unmarried persons, these factors
must be considered.
1. Healthcare Justice and Resource Allocation
There has been much legal, policy, and ethical debate over
notions of healthcare justice and equity, particularly in light of
recent discussions around universal healthcare and healthcare
reform more generally. While a prolonged discussion of
healthcare justice is outside the scope of this paper, a few
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general principles are important to discuss. Norman Daniels
famously stated, “[H]ealthcare was special because of its
impact on opportunity” and the “central function of health care
is to maintain normal functioning.” 195 “Healthcare preserves. . .
the ability to participate in the political, social, and economic
life of their society. It sustains them as fully participating
citizens . . . in all spheres of social life.” 196 This broad notion of
health has been echoed in areas of the law, such as the ADA,
where we focus on impairments that limit major life activities
rather than just the illness or disease itself. 197 Closely related,
if the goals of health policy are to promote “human flourishing,”
then health insurance should help individuals to “function best,
given their circumstances, and thus reduce the vulnerability
associated with ill health.” 198
Healthcare justice and distributive justice issues
necessarily raise the question of what should be considered
healthcare in this context. Narrow definitions of healthcare
that rely solely on the disease model fall short in the world of
infertility. “[M]ost would acknowledge that bearing and raising
children contributes significantly to the parents’ well-being,”
and the ability to reproduce for those who wish it is part of
“normal species functioning.” 199 Decisions about who can or
cannot have access to infertility treatments implicate who will
be able to reproduce and bring into the world and raise the next
generation, thus touching on major issues of reproductive
rights and the government’s role in population control.
Infertility is a complex medical and social condition that
can be uniquely a “couple” problem rather than an “individual”
problem and which can often have no identified medical cause.
As the state mandates themselves suggest, solely linking
infertility to a medical cause is problematic. While eight of the
fourteen mandates require some type of medical cause of
medical necessity, half of these admit that the cause can either

195. Norman Daniels, Justice, Health, and Health Care, 1 AM. J.
BIOETHICS 2, 2 (2001).
196. Id.
197. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2006).
198. J.P. Ruger, The Moral Foundations of Health Insurance, 100 Q J. MED
53, 53, 55–57 (2006).
199. Amy B. Monahan, Value-Based Mandated Health Benefits, 80 U.
COLO. L. REV. 127, 177 (2009) (quoting NORMAN DANIELS, JUST HEALTH:
MEETING HEALTH NEEDS FAIRLY 34, 59 (2008)).

2011]

IT’S AN ART NOT A SCIENCE

699

be medical or unexplained. 200 Furthermore, in the context of
the structurally and medico-structurally infertile, the division
between medically-based and non-medically based infertility
seems irrelevant. Medically infertile persons and structurally
infertile persons are equally desirous of and dependent on ART
to reproduce. If broader notions of health are adopted, the focus
should be on impact of the condition on life and functioning, not
the disease itself. Thus, the focus should be on the inability to
reproduce, regardless of whether it is caused by a medical
disease or otherwise. This argument is also in concert with
classic theories of healthcare needs and distributive justice,
which include “non-medical personal (and social) support
services” within the broader definition of healthcare needs.201 If
the state mandates were solely intended to treat strictly
medically-defined models of infertility, then, at a minimum,
medico-structurally infertile persons must be covered, even if
including gay and unmarried persons may not be required. But
because these mandates do cover infertility which has no
medical basis, we should consider whether to broaden them
under theories of health justice to include unmarried and gay
persons because all groups are seeking the same end result of
procreation.
John Robertson has also argued that the focus should be on
the human interest of reproduction rather than on a strict
medical definition. He wrote:
The label of “natural” or “medical” becomes a way to hide a normative
judgment about the importance of reproduction to gay and lesbian
persons . . . the question then becomes whether unmarried persons,
whatever their gender or sexual orientation, have an important
human interest or need in reproducing. If they do, then they should
not be excluded from ART services provided to others. 202

Alternatively, if state mandates wish to pursue or continue
to pursue a more narrow reading of the statutes, then notions
of healthcare justice would require that they do so across the
board. If medically-derived infertility really does deserve to be
200. These states are Hawaii, Texas, and Maryland. See supra Table 2.
201. Norman Daniels, Health-Care Needs and Distributive Justice, 10
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146, 158 (1981). Daniels uses the analogy of Medicaid to
support the notion of broader health needs. If Medicaid is solely intended to
promote narrow definitions of healthcare, then funds cannot be used to
support abortions. However, if Medicaid “should serve other important goals,
like ensuring that poor and well-off women can equally well control their
bodies, then there is justification for funding abortions.” Id. at 157 n.19.
202. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 331 (2005).
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prioritized or completely privileged over structural infertility,
then legislatures should provide good reasons for why this type
of infertility deserves such treatment and how exclusion of
structural infertility is justified. Furthermore, any states that
allow for any infertility treatment that is non-medical should
discontinue doing so. Thus, Hawaii, Maryland, and Texas
should discontinue providing services to those who have
“unexplained” causes for infertility. 203
Mandated insurance coverage has also raised a number of
health justice concerns more generally. Some have argued that
state mandates are unjust because they divert scarce health
resources to one particular health need. 204 Countering this,
others argue that insurance coverage to treat infertility should
be mandated because insurance companies have adversely
selected against it and such mandates are, thus, necessary to
widen access to such treatments. 205 Others argue that
infertility should not be prioritized because it is not a lethal
condition, and resources should be prioritized to life-saving
treatments. 206 In opposition to this, some raise the issue of
multiple births explaining that “infertile patients who pay outof-pocket for these treatments have a financial incentive to
achieve pregnancy with their first attempt, and they are often
willing to accept the risks associated with a multiple birth in
order to maximize their chances of pregnancy.” 207 If insurance
covers IVF, patients will be more likely to select a procedure
203. See supra Table 2.
204. See, e.g., In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099.
205. See Monahan, supra note 199, at 176; In Vitro Fertilization, supra
note 6, at 2099. See Monahan, supra note 199, at 176.
206. Hawkins, supra note 181, at 224, 225 n.5. In conjunction with this,
ART is a challenging endeavor which often requires multiple rounds of
treatment in order to achieve a successful live birth. For example, according to
a 2007 CDC report, of 101,897 fresh non-donor ART cycles that were started,
29% resulted in a live birth. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2007
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY REPORT 6 (2009) [hereinafter CDC
ART
Report],
available
at
http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2007/PDF/COMPLETE_2007_ART.pdf.
207. Hawkins, supra note 181, at 223. In 2003, 34% of all live births
conceived via IVF were multiples compared with 3% in the general population.
Id. at 222. “A study published in the New England Journal of Medicine found
that the number of embryos transferred per IVF cycle was lower in states that
required complete coverage of IVF than in states that mandated partial or no
coverage. Consequently, the states with mandated coverage had a lower
percentage of pregnancies of triplets or more than in the other states.” Id. at
223–24.
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based on safety than on finances, thus reducing the harms
associated with multiple births, including premature labor,
hypertension, hemorrhage, and gestational labor for the mother
and various physical, developmental, and mental disabilities or
death for the child. 208
At the core of this debate is the issue of how best and how
justly to allocate scarce medical resources. It is important to
note, first, that there is a huge and central debate about
focusing on infertility as a primary area for allocating scarce
health resources. This paper does not discuss whether it is
ethical, just, or practical even to allocate resources for fertility
treatment over other health treatments. Instead, it suggests
that, if society wishes to allocate these resources in such a
manner, it is problematic from a legal, ethical, and healthjustice perspective to do so only for heterosexual married
couples. Even if inclusion of gay and unmarried persons
increases that wedge of health resources, it is important that
health goods be distributed based on fair distributive justice
concerns, not based on social characteristics. Thus, if the
allocated health goods are too great, limitations should be set
in other manners.
For example, ART could be prioritized to those people who
have the greatest need—perhaps because they have fewer
reproductive years remaining or do not have any other
children. Alternatively, one could argue that it is preferable to
give a larger number of persons an opportunity and to provide
a capped service based on price or number of cycles. 209 Under
this argument, single women and lesbians may be prioritized
over others because of the low cost of artificial insemination
compared to ART.
The source of funding for mandatory coverage of ART is
also important. For the most part, current mandates require
that insurance companies either offer or provide coverage, thus
placing the expense on the insurer and, in turn, the insured via
premiums. However, a few states have begun efforts to fund
infertility treatment through state-funded health insurance as
well. For example, Massachusetts has included infertility
related costs in its MassHealth comprehensive family planning

208. Id. at 222.
209. This of course is a version of utilitarianism prioritizing the greatest
good to the greatest number of people.
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services for those who qualify by income. 210 New York has also
initiated a “grant program to improve access to infertility
services” which is funded by the tobacco control and insurance
initiatives pool. 211 Making use of taxpayer dollars to fund
infertility treatments may argue for a larger legislative and
taxpayer debate around who should be prioritized by these
funds.
2. Health Insurance Theory and Purpose
State-mandated insurance and coverage for structural
infertility also implicates issues of the purpose of health
insurance and the theories supporting it. The basic tenets of
health insurance involve the transfer of risk from those
individuals with high healthcare costs to a large pool of lowrisk insured who pay premiums to compensate for losses. 212
While scholars have debated in recent years as to the extent to
which people make insurance choices based on risk-aversion
versus income-loss, health insurance involves, at its core, the
spreading of financial losses associated with healthcare across
broader pools of persons rather than concentrating those costs
on single individuals. 213
Within the broader context of insurance, mandated
insurance coverage for infertility has unique implications.
Mandated insurance coverage may lead to higher utilization
which could, in turn, lead to better quality and reduced cost,
thus helping the structurally infertile to gain access even
where they are excluded from coverage. 214 However, there is
also a concern that mandates may raise insurance premiums.
Here, estimates of premium increases vary significantly, with
some studies approximating lower increases ranging from $2.79
to $27.00 per member per year while other studies project
larger increases such as $105 to $175 per member per year. 215
210. An Act Maximizing Federal Reimbursement for Family Planning
Services, MASS. ACTS 596 (2005).
211. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2807-v(jj) (McKinney 2010).
212. HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 572 (Barry F.
Furrow et al. eds., West Group 5th. ed. 2001); Ruger, supra note 198, at 53–54.
213. John A. Nyman, Health Insurance: The Case of the Missing Welfare
Gain, 9 EUR. J. OF HEALTH ECON. 369, 380–381 (2008), available at
http://www.aria.org/rts/proceedings/2005/Nyman%20-%20Vanishing.pdf;
Ruger, supra note 198, at 53; .
214. See In Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099.
215. One scholar estimates a $7.20 to $27.00 per member per year raise.
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If inclusion of ART in insurance policies does, indeed, raise
premiums, then there is an additional justice concern raised
because gay and unmarried persons would be paying increased
premiums for a healthcare option that they want but are not
permitted to access under the plan. Admittedly, while insured
people cannot opt out of all undesirable situations, say for
example the case where a non-smoker has to pay larger
premiums due to smokers in his insurance pool, this is a
different case. 216 In the smoker case, the non-smoker is not
being denied access to the same care as the smoker, he simply
does not need it. If he, too, were to later need lung cancer
treatment, as an example, it would be available to him in the
same way as the smoker. In the case of gay and unmarried
persons, and particularly medico-structurally infertile persons,
they are potentially paying higher premiums for a procedure
which others are accessing and which they also want but are
denied. Just as some people have argued that it is unjust to
expect infertile persons to pay premiums that cover childbirth
for fertile persons (thus justifying mandated insurance
coverage of ART more generally), so too is it unjust to require
gay and unmarried persons to pay premiums to support statemandated ART without being able to access these benefits. 217
Rationales for mandating insurance coverage of ART for
heterosexual married persons remain the same for gay and
unmarried persons. One author argued that there is a justice
claim generally which calls for insurance mandates covering
ART because it would (1) eliminate adverse selection where
insurers avoid covering infertility and, instead, allow infertility
risk to be pooled across a larger population, (2) reduce
suboptimal utilization of ART, thus reducing risk of high order
multiple births, and (3) benefit infertility patients and the
children resulting from these treatments while likely harming

Monahan, supra note 199, at 174. Another study, however, estimates the
added cost to a standard benefits plan to be only $2.79 per year. Ringo, supra
note 16, at 880. Yet another study “found that even if utilization of IVF rose
300% as a result of the procedure being covered by insurance, premiums would
only increase about nine dollars ($9) per employee per year.” Hawkins, supra
note 181, at 221. The National Center for Policy Analysis projects one of the
larger increases at $105–$175. John Goodman & Merrell Matthews, The Cost
of Health Insurance Mandates, NAT’L CTR. FOR POL’Y ANALYSIS (Aug. 13,
1997), available at http://www.ncpa.org/pub/ba237.
216. In-Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2099.
217. See Monahan, supra note 199, at 176 (arguing that it is unjust to
require infertile people to pay for insurance).

704

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 12:2

individuals unaffected by infertility minimally. 218 The author
admitted that there may be a risk for moral hazard where a
larger group of persons unlikely to benefit from ART may
attempt cycles, but thought this could be minimized by
concentrating efforts towards those who were most likely to
have successful ART cycles. 219 In the instance of statemandated coverage for the structurally-infertile, the arguments
in favor of mandates remain the same. They too would
experience minimized adverse selection, would have the choice
to opt for lower-risk but more expensive technologies that
reduce multiple birth risks, and they would benefit in the same
manner as described for heterosexual married persons. In
addition, because many of the unmarried or gay persons using
ART would not have medically-problematic reproductive issues,
their chances of success with ART cycles would likely be higher
and, in many instances, less expensive, thus reducing moral
hazard concerns.
Another insurance issue particular to same-sex couples is
the lack of availability of domestic partner benefits prevalent
throughout the country. Even if state-mandated insurance can
be construed or even altered to protect gay persons, many same
sex couples find it difficult to find health plans that cover their
partners. A 2007 poll quotes 20% of persons in same-sex
couples as being uninsured as compared with 11.5% of married
individuals. 220 In a poll of 402 of the Fortune 500 companies,
342 offered domestic partner health benefits, with 210 of these
companies located in a state that offers mandated coverage of
ART. 221
218. The author argued that individuals who were infertile would naturally
benefit from mandated insurance because it would make fertility treatment
more available to them. Additionally, risk to children would be lessened
because the reduced risk of multiple births that occur where patients can
choose less risky, more expensive ART, rather than opting for low-cost, highrisk procedures. Id. at 181–83. For fertile persons, the concern was that
increased premiums may cause some individuals to lose insurance, though the
author expected this figure to be low and arguably outweighed by the benefits
to the infertile individuals and children. Id.
219. The concept of moral hazard, more specifically, worries that
individuals will expose themselves to greater risks because they have less
fiscal responsibility for the results. See id.
220. Michael Ash & Lee Badgett, Separate and Unequal: The Effect of
Unequal Access to Employment-Based Health Insurance on Same-Sex and
Unmarried Different Sex Couples, 24 CONTEMP, ECON. POL’Y 582, 588 (2007).
221. Ringo, supra note 16, at 884.
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3. Political, Religious, and Social Issues
The battle over whether to include the structurally infertile
in mandated insurance coverage of infertility is situated within
a much broader discussion centering on the political rights of
gay and unmarried persons, religious and political views on
ART and gay marriage, and the historic battle over parental
rights of gay and unmarried persons, among other issues. This
paper does not begin to attempt to summarize the complex
social, religious, and political pressures that impact legislation
around this issue, but only raises a few of the important and
relevant issues and concerns.
Although beliefs vary by different faiths, religious
disapproval generally exists against homosexuality, procreation
outside of marriage, and ART itself. Catholic teachings, for
example, hold that “procreation should only occur in the
sanctity of a marriage between a man and a woman.” 222 This
belief makes procreation without intercourse problematic, as
well as procreation of unmarried individuals, whether single or
gay. The Jewish faith, in general, is more accepting of ART.
However, when ART is used by lesbians or unmarried women,
the resulting children can be considered illegitimate. 223
Further, artificial insemination is considered immoral because
of the implied need for male masturbation. 224 Protestant views
on ART vary widely, and Islamic views (in Iran at least) do not
“restrict access to ARTs . . . for married, heterosexual couples,”
but withhold ART for same-sex couples and single women
because they view reproduction by those groups as
undesirable. 225 The general religious disfavor of ART,
homosexuality, and procreation outside of marriage may have
significant impact on laws and public policy, along with societal
views on these practices.
In conjunction, it is important to note that some of the
states mandating insurance coverage for infertility have
created statutory protections that allow religious institutions to
opt out of coverage 226 that is “inconsistent with the religious

222. DeLair, supra note 33, at 154.
223. Id. at 155–56
224. Id. at 155–56; Rank, supra note 7, at 124.
225. Rank, supra note 7, at 123–24.
226. Among states providing religious exemption are California,
Connecticut, Maryland, New Jersey, and Texas. NCSL, supra note 67.
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organization’s religious and ethical principles.” 227 Given some
of the religious views discussed above, it would not be
surprising if religious institutions frequently used these
statutory protections as a means of avoiding coverage of ART.
However, it is unclear if institutions have attempted to avoid
coverage of ART for a structurally infertile person. Interesting
civil rights and religious rights issues may be raised if a legal
challenge was brought on behalf of a gay or unmarried person
because a religious institution was denying ART specifically to
him or her under one of these mandates. Though this is outside
the scope of this paper, it is an important area for future
research and attention.
In line with religious objections, there is also the possibility
that personal prejudice or religious views of physicians will
have an impact at the level of healthcare delivery. One
California case, North Coast Women’s Care Medical Group, Inc.
v. San Diego County Superior Court, struggled with this
issue. 228 A physician in the medical group denied Ms.
Guadalupe Benitez, a lesbian, access to intrauterine
insemination for her and her partner based on religious
objections. 229 The California Supreme Court held that the First
Amendment right of free exercise of religion did not guarantee
a right to deny fertility treatment based on sexual
orientation. 230 Other states have not yet begun to deal with
this issue in their court systems, but the case highlights
another area where structural infertility may be impacted. In
line with this concern, a study published in 2005 suggested
that fertility clinics believe that it is part of their role to screen
227. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §1374.55 (West 2008). Accord CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 38a-536 (West 2007) (allowing exemption for “treatment[s] of
infertility that are contrary to the religious employer’s bona fide religious
tenets”); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1751.01 (LexisNexis 2009) (requiring health
maintenance organizations to cover “basic health services” which include
“infertility services”).
228. N. Coast Women’s Care Med. Group, Inc. v. San Diego Cnty. Superior
Court, 189 P.3d 959 (Cal. 2008).
229. Id. at 963–64.
230. Id. at 967 (“Here, defendant physicians contend that exposing them to
liability for refusing to perform the IUI medical procedure for plaintiff
infringes upon their First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise
of religion. Not so. As we noted earlier, California’s Unruh Civil Rights Act
imposes on business establishments certain antidiscrimination obligations,
thus precluding any such establishment or its agents from telling patrons that
it will not comply with the Act.”).
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potential ART recipients for parental fitness. 231 Clinics stated
numerous considerations and reasons for turning away certain
candidates. Twenty percent of clinics said they would turn
down a woman who wanted to parent singly; fifty-three percent
said they would turn down a single man; and forty-eight
percent reported being unwilling or unlikely to provide
treatment to a gay couple wanting to use surrogacy with one of
the men as a sperm donor. 232 If the structurally infertile are
included in state-mandated insurance coverage, extra care will
need to be taken to ensure that they are not excluded from
access at the patient-provider level for religious or personal
views.
The state-mandates themselves also raise some clear
practical issues with respect to implementation and
application. For example, to whom must it be ultimately proven
that an individual has engaged in unprotected intercourse for
the required amount of time, and how can this fact be verified?
Likewise, what are the implications of such a requirement for
the transmission of sexually transmitted infections? How
frequently and how monogamously does one have to engage in
unprotected intercourse to qualify under such a mandate?
Additionally, it may be very difficult for medico-structurally
infertile persons to prove medical infertility or know that they
are medically infertile if they engage in same-sex intercourse or
are abstinent. Similarly, how must one prove a number of years
of infertility, whether it be medically or structurally based,
what should fall under the heading of medically necessary in
this arena, and who should decide? Though specific
requirements in the statute may be necessary to prioritize
limited resources and to ensure that those with the greatest
need receive appropriate care, many of the current
requirements are difficult to prove, ambiguous, and may
potentially cause public health concerns.
Insurance coverage of ART for structurally infertile
persons under state mandates is affected by a number of other
factors. Gay marriage, religious objections, child welfare and
custody, among many other considerations, all play into the
231. Mary Crossley, Dimensions of Equality in Regulating Assisted
Reproductive Technologies, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 273, 275 (2005); Andrea
D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Assisted Reproductive
Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 63 (2005).
232. Crossley, supra note 231, at 275–76; Gurmankin, supra note 231, at
65.
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debate around whether gay and unmarried persons should
have access to ART and whether insurance should cover it.
Notions of health justice support providing some type of
coverage of ART for the structurally infertile, 233 but the
complex interplay between political and social issues, as well as
insurance theory and healthcare allocation, raises the
challenging question of how best to distribute and ensure
access to ART for the structurally infertile. The next section
will explore some of the benefits and drawbacks of possible
mechanisms of distribution.
V. PROPOSALS FOR DISTRIBUTION AND CONCLUSION
The issue of assisted reproduction and insurance is still
alive and well. Currently, only fourteen states have provided
some form of mandate that insurance cover ART, and no
federal laws regulate the issue of whom does or does not have
access to these technologies. 234 Thus, there is large space for
policy to still develop and change in this area. Three potential
models and their benefits and drawbacks will be discussed as
possible mechanisms for remaining states to consider
broadening access to ART.
A. TAX REBATES
Under the tax deduction proposal, costs of assisted
reproductive technologies can be declared under section 213 of
the Internal Revenue Code, the medical expense deduction, and
can be deducted from one’s federal income tax. 235 Under the
current statute, “a taxpayer may claim unlimited expenses for
fertility technology, but only if the taxpayer can afford to spend
over 7.5% percent [sic] of his or her income on such
treatment.” 236 Not much is known about the implications of a
tax credit in this situation as the proposal to use tax credits for
these purposes is fairly new. However, from a theoretical
perspective, the tax deduction proposal has a number of
anticipated benefits as well as a few drawbacks. This proposal
presumably rids the system of bias based on sexual orientation
or marital status and instead allows for all persons interested
233.
234.
235.
236.

Monahan, supra note 199, at 178–79.
NCSL, supra note 67.
Ringo, supra note 16, at 887.
Benjamin, supra note 57, at 1140.
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in using ART to deduct expenses, thus eliminating issues of
health injustice. It also resolves the issue that many gay people
do not have domestic partner benefits because, under the tax
deduction proposal, one partner can deduct expenses on his or
her taxes, regardless of insurance status. 237 However, it does
not resolve issues at the provider-patient level. Though the tax
deduction method also widens the ability for some to access
ART, it does not provide further options for those who lack the
finances to pay up-front costs for ART. 238
Due to the tax deduction model’s inability to cover up-front
costs combined with the high cost of ART, for some people,
whether medically or structurally infertile, issues of access
would not be resolved. For lesbians and single women, the
model may be ideal because the procedures sought, such as
artificial insemination, are inexpensive, but this method is not
helpful if multiple attempts are needed. 239 Also, for the medicostructurally infertile or for single or gay men who need more
expensive interventions, having to front-load several tens of
thousands of dollars likely means that access will not be
possible. 240 According to one commentator, “This perhaps
explains the heavy emphasis on insurance in debates about
assisted-reproduction finance.” 241 While further research into
this area is important, it will be crucial to determine if there is
a manner to manage front-loaded costs of ART within this
system.
B. INSURANCE MANDATES
As insurance mandates currently stand, they result in
inequitable distribution of resources by prioritizing all fertility
treatments to heterosexual married couples and excluding
access primarily for gay and unmarried persons with or
without medical causes of their infertility. While the current
structure of state mandates poses some legal issues and health
justice problems, the idea of state-mandated insurance for ART
is not in and of itself inherently inequitable. Insurance
mandates could result in more equitable distribution of
resources, but a number of considerations must be addressed.

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Ringo, supra note 16, at 887.
Jacoby, supra note 42, at 152.
DeLair, supra note 33, at 160–61.
Id.
Jacoby, supra note 42, at 152.
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Both internal and external exclusionary factors, as discussed in
previous sections, need to be explored in greater detail to
determine their impact on different groups.
With respect to some of the external factors discussed
previously, a mandate to offer rather than a mandate to cover,
as seen in California and Texas, could lead to greater equity. 242
It would give everyone, regardless of marital status or sexual
orientation, the ability to bargain for ART if it is important to
them and, if desired, to pay the resulting insurance premiums
for such treatments. It would also likely reduce costs of ART
overall given the presumably higher use of ART throughout the
country, which could potentially increase access for individuals
who either lack insurance or live in states without mandated
insurance. However, because insurance companies would only
be required to offer but not to provide coverage, there is a
possibility that a smaller pool of persons will be willing to buy
infertility coverage. 243 This will make premiums higher 244 and
possibly too expensive for many to afford.
Other external factors utilized in state-mandated
insurance coverage could also expand access to gay and
unmarried persons and resolve healthcare justice issues. Caps
on the amount of money available for ART or on the number of
procedures are limits which could give everyone an opportunity
to procreate via ART without limiting access for gay and
unmarried persons. 245 Of course, this type of limit would
restrict coverage of ART overall; thus, some individuals who
would require multiple rounds of IVF (for example, due to older
maternal age or severe fertility disorder) may not be able to
achieve a live birth before they have run out of their allotted
funds. However, this approach provides a larger number of
people with at least some opportunity to attempt to procreate,
and there are no guarantees that ART will achieve pregnancy
242. California: “every health care service plan . . . shall offer coverage for
the treatment of infertility, except in vitro fertilization,” CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 1374.55 (West 2008); Texas: “an issuer of a group health
benefit plan that provides pregnancy-related benefits . . . shall offer and make
available . . . coverage for . . . expenses incurred . . . from in vitro fertilization
procedures.” TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1366.003 (West 2009). See generally
NCSL, supra note 67 (listing the insurance coverage laws for infertility
applicable to each state).
243. In-Vitro Fertilization, supra note 6, at 2100.
244. Id.
245. See statutes cited supra note 71.
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for everyone anyway. Furthermore, limits like the ones in New
Jersey and Illinois, which require that an individual go through
the most inexpensive treatments first, could help to broaden
access without harming the structurally infertile. 246
Additionally, as the section on legal analysis suggests,
there are some internal factors within the statutes that are
more desirable than others with respect to the needs of the
structurally infertile and medico-structurally infertile. For
example, requirements of a stated period of infertility or even
unprotected intercourse for a period of time are not problematic
if they are adapted to include the structurally and medicostructurally infertile. So long as gay and unmarried persons
can prove structural infertility without having to engage in
unprotected sex, there is no public health concern nor are there
the wasted resources of attempting to prove medical infertility
for someone who does not have medically-related complications.
Spousal language is not advisable due to its exclusion of
most groups of structurally and medico-structurally infertile
regardless of medical cause and its potential resulting legal
issues. Issues of medical causality or medical necessity are
interesting and more complex. While they, without a doubt, do
not exclude medico-structurally infertile, the issue is much less
clear for structurally infertile persons. While there is an
argument to be made on either side as to whether structural
infertility is a health issue (which greatly depends as
previously discussed on how broadly one defines health), it is
not clear that the medical cause is what we are concerned
about. As discussed earlier, the real toll to society from
infertility seems to be the infringement of the rights of
individuals to become parents, which is viewed as a life
achievement, and this argument holds true regardless of
whether one is speaking of heterosexual married couples or
not. 247
Additionally, it is unclear whether it is desirable to attach
a medical diagnosis and the related social and other
implications to structural infertility. Some have encouraged a
medicalized model of infertility covered by insurance. Such a
model can reduce other inequities, such as financially helping
those infertile individuals who go into debt in trying to finance
their pregnancies. It could also create standards for “what
246. See statutes cited supra note 72.
247. Monahan, supra note 199, at 176.
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kinds of fertility treatments make sense” 248 and which do not 249
while also eliminating use of ART by heterosexual couples that
do not need the technology to reproduce. However, in some
ways, medicalizing may attach a medical diagnosis stigma to
sexual orientation or marital status. Further research and
discussion is needed in this area. At the outset, it seems more
logical to expand these types of statutes to call for infertility,
whether medical or structural, because it is an important social
desire rather than just linked to medical conditions and not the
other way around. Such a definition would also eliminate those
instances where medical cause cannot be found. Furthermore,
these concerns can be addressed in statutory language that
does not, in a broad stroke, exclude whole groups of people that
depend on these technologies.
Given both options, the better practice appears to be a
state-mandated insurance schematic that uses external factors
rather than internal factors to limit coverage and that does not
make resource allocation decisions based on sexual orientation
or marital status alone. Legislatures are encouraged to
consider what types of external factors, such as treatment
amount and dollar limits, could provide the most just and
practical limits on care while ensuring broad access and
successful outcomes. Mandates to offer rather than cover may
be good options, along with caps on total amount per person or
limits on the number of ART cycles per patient. Additionally, if
internal factors are used, careful consideration should be given
to whether medical definitions are necessary and, if so, to what
purpose. Furthermore, spousal language is discouraged, and,
where structural infertility can be shown, requirements of
unprotected intercourse are also problematic. Additionally,
legislatures must consider the broader context in which statemandated insurance coverage for ART is placed. Widened
access for gay and unmarried persons is not beneficial if issues
of parental custody and domestic partner benefits are not
resolved in this context. Furthermore, as outlined in this paper,
legislatures must keep in mind the legal limitations raised by
the Fourteenth Amendment and ADA claims in particular.
It is also important to note that this discussion of possible
mechanisms of distribution is not intended to be exhaustive.

248. Spar & Harrington, supra note 5, at 68.
249. See id.
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Certainly, other models of access could be proposed such as a
hybrid-model or a social-welfare model, which treats ART more
like a social issue (like food, housing, or shelter). Further
research and policy development in this area is important, as is
more empirical work into the implications—financial, social,
and otherwise—of state-mandated insurance coverage of ART
in the context of married heterosexual persons as well as the
structurally and medico-structurally infertile.
As the title insinuates, regulation of ART and deciding who
receives it is truly an art and not a science. Balancing the
interest of the broad host of individuals who desire ART and
prioritizing needs at the same time will require much
innovation. The issue of ART and who receives ART touches
upon some of the most significant legal, ethical, moral, and
political questions of our time. ART holds the potential for a
wide variety of people to create families, who previously could
not, and this group includes those who are unmarried or gay.
ART, state-mandated insurance coverage of ART, and access
and coverage of insurance for gay and unmarried persons,
challenge the boundaries of law, medicine, and ethics. These
issues also touch on a foundational question of the state’s role
when deciding whether to ensure or prevent the reproductive
potential of individuals and groups. Such dialogue cannot be
entered into lightly, and, as the debate around distribution and
prioritization of ART continues, it will be important to critically
analyze both the potential and limitations of state-mandated
insurance coverage for ART in current and future forms and
the goals which it seeks to address.

